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As we enter the full swing of the 1992 election campaign, the public is
being deluged with proposals to reform American medicine. No one seriously
doubts that American medical care is financially troubled and increasingly
inaccessible to many.1 In 1991, total health expenditures were approximately
$740 billion,2 yet thirty-four million Americans-about 14% of the popula-
tion-were without health insurance and countless more were underinsured.3
Some health insurance plans are collapsing. 4 Others struggle to contain premi-
um increases two and three times the rate of general inflation with "managed
care" policies that not only restrict choices but also alienate many patients and
physicians alike. Survey after survey finds a majority of Americans dissatisfied
with the cost of medical care and fearful about their futures.5
The array of reform proposals, from marginal tinkering to fundamental
reform, can easily bewilder. Candidates, political pundits, policy experts-all
frame the problems somewhat differently and characterize the "solutions" in
quite incongruous ways.6 Acronyms and catchy phrases dominate. President
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1. For example, 91% of chief executives surveyed believed that U.S. medical-care arrangements
needed "fundamental change or complete rebuilding." Philip J. Hilts, Corporate Chiefs See Need for U.S.
Health-Care Action, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, at DI [hereinafter Hilts, Corporate Chiefs].
2. Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Health Bill Expected to Rise by 11% for '91, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1991,
at AlO. In 1990, the United States spent $666 billion or 12.2% of GNP. Katharine R. Levit et al., National
Health Expenditures 1990, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1991, at 29.
3. For range of estimates, see Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA
2491 (1991) [hereinafter Friedman, Dilemma to Crisis]. Most of those without insurance coverage come
from families with a working parent. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CANADIAN HEALTH INSURANCE:
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 24 (1991) [hereinafter CANADIAN HEALTH INSURANCE].
4. Failed or fraudulent plans left more than 400,000 individuals (from 1988-1990) unexpectedly without
coverage. Barry Meier, A Growing U.S. Affliction: Worthless Health Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1992,
at Al.
5. Robert J. Blendon et al., Satisfaction with Health Systems in Ten Nations, HEALTH AFF., Summer
1990, at 185, 185-92. Eighty-nine percent reportedly agreed that the U.S. medical-care system needs either
"fundamental changes" or "complete rebuilding." Id. at 188. See generally SYSTEM IN CRISIS: THE CASE
FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM 149 (Robert J. Blendon & Jennifer N. Edwards eds., 1991). See also Celinda
Lake, Health Care: The Issue of the Nineties in this volume.
6. At our last count, there were over forty proposals in Congress, a plan by President Bush, and
several proposals by the top Democratic Presidential contenders. In town meetings across the country in
January, Democratic congressional representatives offered three reforms options: "Medicare for All," "Play
or Pay," and "Fully Public Single-Payer," in contrast with a plan to "Modify Current System to Expand
Access" (read "tinkering"). See, e.g., Rep. Rosa DeLauro, Remarks at New Haven, Connecticut Town
Meeting (Jan. 1992).
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Bush, for instance, describes his plan for expanded tax credits, vouchers and
deductions as "comprehensive," but devotes little attention to financing or
overall cost control.7 Both the Heritage Foundation's proposal for mandatory
purchase of insurance and Alain Enthoven's oligopolistic "Consumer Choice
Health Plan" are advertised as "pro-competitive. "' Others argue for "managed
care, " 9 while the New York Times regularly extols "managed competition"
as the correct reform of American medicine. I" Commentators label proposals
by Congressman Marty Russo" and Senator Bob Kerrey 2 alternatively as
"single-payer," "Canadian-style health insurance," or "national health insur-
ance.""i In examining the array of proposals, most Americans find it almost
impossible to separate tinkering from partial, but useful, steps forward, and
then to distinguish those steps from fundamental reform. A citizen's guide is
needed.4
In Part One, we describe some of the contemporary problems with
American medicine that frustrate providers and patients alike. We then explore
some of the familiar mythologies of America's medical-care debate. We focus
particularly on the false claim that any form of universal health insurance,
publicly financed or regulated, is incompatible with American values and
institutions.
In Part Two, we turn to the relevance of international experience to the
current debate. Perhaps the only advantage of being the last industrial nation
7. THE PRESIDENT'S COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM (1992) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
PROGRAM].
8. Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s (pts. 1 & 2),
320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 29, 94 [hereinafter Enthoven & Kronick, Consumer-Choice]; Stuart M. Butler,
A Tax Reform Strategy to Deal with the Uninsured, 265 JAMA 2541 (1991) [hereinafter Butler, Tax Reform
Strategy]; Is It Health Care Reform? A Test, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1991, at D16. See also STUART
BUTLER, THE COMPETITIVE PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTH COST INFLATION, (Heritage Foundation Back-
grounder No. 111, 1980); For Health: Healthy Competition. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, at A18 (compar-
ing Kerrey, Clinton, and Tsongas plans); The Health Care System Is Broken, and Here's How to Fix It,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1991, at A14. For a critique of the Enthoven plan as entailing regulation that limits
competition, see William J. Lynk, Regulation and Competition:An Examination of 'The Consumer Choice
Health Plan," 6 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 625 (1982).
9. For pithy critiques of this view, see, e.g., Managed Care Hasn't Lived Up to Its Promises, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, at A24 (letters to the editor).
10. See Tax Credits for Health: Wrong Rx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at A18; A Tax Cap, to Cap
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, at A16. The editorial board seems most enamored of a combination
of the Heritage Foundation's proposal and one by Alain Enthoven.
11. H.R. 1300, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Universal Health Care Act of 1991).
12. S. 1446, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Health USA Act of 1991).
13. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Democrats Get Chance to Turn Health-Care Anxiety into '92 Votes, WASH. POST,
July 1, 1991, at A 12; Elizabeth Kolbert, The 1992 Campaign: Media; Candidates Learn that AttacksAttract
Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1992, at A9 (Kerrey proposal); Michael Wines, The 1992 Campaign:
White House; Bush Links Rivals' Plan to Socialism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1992, at A9 (Russo proposal).
14. For historical accounts of the debate about national medical care, see Theodore R. Marmor, et
al., The Politics of Medical Inflation, 1 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 69 (1976); NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE: CONFLICTING GOALS AND POLICY CHOICES (Judith Feder et al. eds., 1980); THEODORE R.
MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (1973); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN MEDICINE (1982).
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to address universal health insurance is that we can draw upon the extensive
experimentation of others. From international experience, we note five broad
principles of medical-care financing and administration that mark otherwise
widely varying programs.
Part Three reviews some familiar frameworks used to describe existing
medical-care financing and access problems and to evaluate reform proposals.
The conventional labels for plans, we argue, are seriously inadequate. More-
over, the traditional policy analyst's checklist-enumeration of a reform
proposal's benefit package, beneficiaries, administration, and financing-gives
the appearance of comprehensive analysis without explaining how (or how
well) a plan would actually work. These descriptions fail to highlight the scope
of reform, the relevant principles that different plans embody, or the particular
problems each proposal aims to correct. We suggest ways to distinguish
programs that are badly designed Band-Aids from those incremental steps or
fundamental changes that provide the basis for durable policy change. We also
emphasize that the separate features of competing, viable national health
insurance plans cannot be combined without contradictory outcomes. Clear
choices must be made.
In Part Four we sketch several different, yet sensible, steps toward uni-
versal health insurance. We make two central points: first, regardless of the
initial step forward, it is crucial that the administrative and financial structure
of the overall program be properly set up at the outset; and second, organized
interest groups in medicine and insurance must be challenged to obtain any
workable reform.
Whatever approach medical-care reform takes, responsible analysts and
policymakers must answer at least the following key questions:
o Who will be insured?
o What medical services will be insured?
o How will the financial burden for the provision of medical care be
distributed?
o How will defensible borders be put on what we spend?
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I. MEDICAL-CARE REALITY, MEDICAL-CARE MYTHOLOGY
A. The Troubled Reality of Medical-Care Financing and Administration
America's current medical arrangements are economically, socially, and
politically unsustainable. Spiralling costs, incomplete coverage, and baffling
insurance arrangements head the list of serious complaints. The United States
spends more on medical care than any other nation, 5 but dissatisfaction is
high, 6 and America's health outcomes (e.g., life expectancy, infant mortality)
are comparatively disappointing.' 7 Furthermore, during any given two-year
period, over sixty million Americans lack health insurance.'" Even the rela-
tively well-insured worry about gaps in their coverage and the paper work frus-
trates everyone. 9 Far from a "health-care system," America now labors
under a confusing financial mix of private insurance, government-provided
insurance for the elderly (Medicare) and some of the poor (Medicaid), Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and other "managed" care programs, the
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services for military
personnel and their dependents (CHAMPUS), the Veterans Administration
(VA), and employer-provided plans, as well as tax credits, deductions and
exclusions.
The American experience offers an object lesson in the inability of private-
ly based controls to constrain overall medical-care expenditures. Instead, as
we describe below, such efforts have led to higher administrative costs and
growing numbers of uninsured, without significant overall cost containment.
Over the last decade, as terms such as "the medical industry" replaced older
expressions like doctors, patients, and health insurance, the country pursued
a bewildering mix of private solutions: business coalitions at the local level,
self-insurance by large firms, experiments in group practice, increases in
consumer payments (deductibles, co-insurance), and utilization review and
15. See Hilts, Corporate Chiefs, supra note 1, at DI.
16. See Lake, supra note 5, in this volume.
17. In 1986, life expectancy at birth of U.S. females was 78.3 years, and of males 71.3 years,
compared with 79.7 and 73.0 for Canada, and 78.4 and 71.8 for Germany, respectively. The U.S. infant
mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) in 1988 was 10.0 compared with 7.2 for Canada and 7.6 for
Germany. At the same time, 1988 expenditures as a percentage of GNP were 10.9 % for the United States,
8.5 % for Canada, and 8.3 % for Germany. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Dev., OECD
Health Database (1991) (available from OECD, CREDES File) [hereinafter OECD Health Database].
18. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 2491. In 1989, an estimated 33.4 million Americans (13.6%) had
no health insurance. Of the uninsured, 25.6% were children. COMMITTEE ON WAYS & MEANS, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1991 GREEN BOOK 307, 309
(1991) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK]. The number of Americans who are without insurance at any one time
is larger than the cited figure for the year because people go in and out of insurance status. Sixty percent
of Americans were insured through employer plans, while another 12.8% were covered under Medicare,
6.0% under Medicaid, and 7.7% through CHAMPUS, individually purchased po!icies, or other sources.
Id. at 309.
19. Theodore R. Marmor, U.S. Medical-Care System, WALL. ST. 1., June 20, 1992, at A15.
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prior authorization arrangements that insurance companies use to monitor and
control the provision of services by doctors and hospitals.2"
It is no wonder that private health insurance firms have not been able to
constrain overall national medical costs.2' Each insurance company makes
private decisions to minimize its costs and maximize its profits; individual
firms do not make societal decisions about containing societal costs. 22 Premi-
ums paid to insurers finance administrative overhead and insurance profits-
both essentially waste from the patient's point of view. Private insurance firms
spend large and increasing sums on utilization reviews, marketing, and billing.
The result has been a staggering growth of organizational and managerial
innovations (Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), HMOs, case manage-
ment, etc.) that have failed to restrain the relentless rise in national health
expenditures or to prevent declining access to insurance protection. 3 As Ken
Macke, head of the Dayton-Hudson retail chain and a spokesman for the
National Coalition for Health Care, told a congressional committee in June
1991:
[W]e have tried everything-increased employee cost-sharing, second surgical
opinions, health promotion and prevention, and managed-care options like health
maintenance organizations-and still our premiums went up 15 percent. Private
cost control ... has failed.24
The "pro-competitive" reform efforts of the 1970s and 1980s, which sought
to promote price competition in the medical market, have created disappointing
(and sometimes perverse) results. "The increasing emphasis on competition
and managed care has," in the words of one Canadian critic, "set many new
places at the health-care feast. These administrative overheads, which, from
the Canadian perspective, are just so much waste motion, add $50-100 billion
to American costs."' The U.S. spends an astonishing one-fifth of its health-
20. See, e.g., BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE 274 (1991).
21. For an excellent account of the costs of relying on for-profit, private insurance companies in
providing health insurance, see 1 CANADIAN ROYAL COMMISSION ON HEALTH SERVICES 732 (1964).
Seeking profits by excluding individuals who are sick from insurance is not what insurance is supposed
to be about. As Winston Churchill said, insurance is "the application of averages for the relief of millions."
Id. at 10.
22. See, e.g., Deborah A. Stone, AIDS and the Moral Economy of Insurance, AM. PROSPECT, Spring
1990, at 62.
23. Lawrence D. Brown & Catherine McLaughlin, Constraining Costs at the Community Level: A
Critique, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1990, at 5 (reviewing failure of community-based cost containment). Cf.
Alan B. Cohen et al., The Funders, HEALTH AFF., winter 1990, at 29; Donald R. Cohodes, A Private
Insurer, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1990, at 34; Jack Meyer, An Economist, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1990, at
38; George M. Stiles & John T. Dunlop, A Local Program Director and a National Advisory Chairman,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1990, at 42 (all discussing the Brown critique). See also GRAY, supra note 20, at
302 (cost effects of utilization management are uncertain).
24. Commentary on Canadian Health Insurance: Lessons for the United States: Hearings Before the
House Committee on Government Operations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Kenneth Macke).
See also Hilts, Corporate Chiefs, supra note 1, at DI.
25. Robert G. Evans, Tension, Compression, and Shear: Directions, Stresses, and Outcomes of Health
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care dollars on billing and other non-medical administrative costs.26 "Indeed,"
as Robert Evans has shown, "Canadians spent less per capita to administer
universal comprehensive coverage than Americans spent to administer Medi-
care and Medicaid alone (about $26 U.S. per capita)."27
26. Amitai Etzioni, Health Care Rationing: A Critical Evaluation, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at
88, 91. One estimate is between 19% and 24%. Steffie Woolhandler & David Himmelstein, The Deteriorat-
ing Administrative Efficiency of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1253 (1991); see
also David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Cost Without Benefit: Administrative Waste in U.S.
Health Care, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 441; Morris L. Barer et al., Canadian/U.S. Health Care: Reflections
on the HIAA 's Analysis, 10 HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991, at 229, 233-34 ("average annual growth in real per
capita costs for administering the U.S. system was over 5 percent; in Canada, this figure was about 1.6
percent"). Administrative costs come in many forms. Some are recorded, while others are hidden-like
the countless hours spent by patients filling out forms.
27. Robert G. Evans et al., Controlling Health Expenditures-The Canadian Reality, 320 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 571, 573 (citation omitted) (1989) [hereinafter Evans et al., Canadian Reality].
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An enormously frustrating aspect of contemporary American medicine-for
both medical providers and their patients-is administrative intrusiveness.
Many insurance plans and HMOs routinely require costly utilization reviews
that monitor providers' medical decisions, limit treatment, and constrain
patients' choice of doctors and hospitals.2" The paperwork associated with
this complex system of financing and professional oversight not only contrib-
utes to substantial and rapidly rising administrative costs, but also confuses
patients and angers doctors. Such controls, claims one critic, are "crippling
the soul of the kind of doctor we should all want to preserve.'29 Indeed, 30%
of physicians, according to one recent survey, say they would not have attend-
ed medical school had they known what their medical practices would be
like.3 °
Private insurance companies, as well as most HMOs and many Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plans, differentiate among health insurance applicants on
the basis of their expected health risk. Wide-spread screening increasingly
leads to outright denials, exclusion of "pre-existing conditions" from coverage,
or substantially increased premiums.31 Small groups and individuals are the
usual targets of these practices; they typically face experience-rated premiums
(based on past sickness history) rather than community-rated premiums (based
on the average per capita costs of insuring a larger group).32 Families in
larger, employer-based insurance pools also routinely face experience-rated
premiums.3 3 Moreover, because a lost job may mean the loss of health insur-
ance, even employees with good coverage fear becoming "insurance hostages"
to their current jobs.34
Employer plans and insurance companies require "cost-sharing" (co-
payments, co-insurance, and deductibles) by patients in order to shift costs to
28. Utilization review is an administrative monitoring of the services offered or provided by doctors
and hospitals. This review is usually undertaken in order to determine whether an insurer or other third-
party payer will reimburse the health-care provider for such services. See generally GRAY, supra note 20.
29. Robert Kerrey, Why America Will Adopt Comprehensive Health Care Reform, AM. PROSPECT,
Summer 1991, at 81, 85.
30. Regina Herzlinger, Healthy Competition, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1991, at 69, 71. See
Humphrey Taylor et al., Physicians' Responses to Their Changing Environment, in SYSTEM IN CRISIS,
supra note 5, at 149.
31. See Emily Friedman, Insurers Under Fire, HEALTH MGMT. Q., Third Quarter 1991, at 23, 24
[hereinafter Friedman, Insurers Under Fire] (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL
TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE (1988)); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Health Insurance: Cost
Increases Lead to Coverage Limitations & Cost Shifting 15 (1990); Milt Freudenheim, Employers Winning
Wide Leeway to Cut Medical Insurance Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at D2.
32. Friedman, supra note 31, at 26.
33. Glenn Kramon, Medical Insurers Vary Fees to Aid Healthier People, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1991,
at Al.
34. Paul Cotton, Preexisting Conditions 'Hold Americans Hostage' to Employers and Insurance, 265
JAMA 2451 (1991).
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patients and reduce utilization."a While in 1989, 17% of insured employees
had plans with maximum out-of-pocket expenses over $2,000, by 1990 the
figure had jumped to 25%. Today, over half of all group/staff HMOs require
co-payments (the patients' share of payments which is covered by insurance)
for services.36
Cost-sharing, in our view, works against the efficient provision of sensible
care. It is unlikely to reduce significantly the utilization of high-cost, high-
technology, high-intensity services. This is so both because the demand for
such services is largely physician-determined and because the costs of such
services vastly exceed almost all cost-sharing limits.37 Cost-sharing does,
however, measurably reduce access to preventive care.3" It also negatively
affects children's health and reduces the life expectancy of poor individuals
with high blood pressure.39 In addition, cost-sharing may reduce the likeli-
hood that those with serious medical symptoms requiring medical attention will
actually seek such care.' Finally, cost-sharing causes "similar reductions in
both appropriate and inappropriate care,"41 which suggests that imposing costs
on patients does not aid them in determining when medical care is really
necessary.
Despite having the highest level of direct patient payment of any
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country,
American utilization rates have continued to rise.42 It should be noted, how-
ever, that more of the increase in national health expenditures in the 1980s was
attributable to medical price inflation than to increased utilization or population
35. Insurance schemes include cost-sharing on the assumption that insurance creates a "moral hazard"
that would induce otherwise healthy individuals to seek medical care, free at the point of delivery as a
,merit good." Cost-sharing is an umbrella term for out-of-pocket expenses imposed by insurance schemes.
36. Cynthia Sullivan & Thomas Rice, Data Watch: The Health Insurance Picture in 1990, HEALTH
AFF., Summer 1990, at 104, 113-14.
37. Theodore R. Marmor et al., Medical Care and Procompetitive Reform, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1003,
1014 (1981) [hereinafter Marmor et al., Procompetitive Reform] (discussing price inelasticity of such
services). See also Emmett B. Keeler & John E. Rolph, The Demand for Episodes of Treatment in the
Health Insurance Experiment, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 337, 363 (1988) (interpreting RAND data).
38. Nicole Lurie et al., Preventive Care: Do We Practice What We Preach?, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
801, 803-04 (1987) (interpreting RAND data).
39. Robert H. Brook, et al., Does Free Care Improve Adults'Health?, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1426,
1431 (1983); Arleen Leibowitz, Effect of Cost-Sharing on the Use of Medical Services by Children: Interim
Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 75 PEDIATRICS 942 (1985) (interpreting RAND data).
40. Martin F. Shapiro, Out-of-Pocket Payments & Use of Care for Serious and Minor Symptoms, 149
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1645, 1646-48 (1989). Cf Martin F. Shapiro et al., Effects of Cost Sharing
on Seeking Care for Serious and Minor Symptoms, 104 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 246, 250 (1986)
(expressing lack of confidence in RAND data on this point).
41. Keeler& Rolph, supra note 37, at 363; Kathleen N. Lohr et al., Use of Medical Care in the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment: Diagnosis and Service-Specific Analyses, MED. CARE, Sept. 1986 Supp.,
at S1, S72; Albert L. Siu et al., Inappropriate Use of Hospitals in a Randomized Trial of Health Insurance
Plans, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1986) (interpreting RAND data).
42. Evans, Tension, Compression, and Shear, supra note 25, at 120. The Canadian experience shows
that none of the provincial governments believe that utilization is price elastic. "At present, a province
which imposed user charges would have its federal grant reduced by the amount of the charges; but it would
still retain all savings from reduced utilization. No province now has user charges." Id. at 120.
Vol. 10:228, 1992
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growth.43 Cost-sharing has not acceptably contained American medical costs.
In fact, the administrative expense associated with complex mixes of deduct-
ibles and co-payments has added to America's total health expenditures.
B. Myths about American Medical Care and its Politics
Enduring myths about the financing of American medical care have greatly
affected the current policy debate. Throughout the history of American medical
politics, these mythologies have misshaped the views of many and have
substantially distorted the available choices. Consider the following claims.
1. The Market Can Fix It
There are many who claim that what American medical care needs is a
healthy dose of competition." The call for more marketplace competition in
American medicine is not new.45 Yet, for good reason, there has not been
a fully competitive and free market in medical care in America-or in any
other country-in the twentieth century.' Few Americans want medical care
allocated or denied like ordinary goods and services ," and many would fear
a world in which doctors, nurses, and hospitals were completely unlicensed
and unmonitored and in which drugs and medical equipment were marketed
without testing for safety and efficacy. Indeed, few "pro-market" advocates
would argue for such a world. In any event, inherent information asymmetries
mean that near-perfect competition in the medical-care market is impossible.48
The question thus becomes: which form of government intervention will foster
greater cost control and broader access to quality medical care? Pro-competi-
tive reforms are unlikely to foster either cost control or efficiency, or to lead
to broad, fair access to necessary medical-care insurance.49 The available
international evidence indicates that government can restrain medical costs
43. Levit et al., supra note 2, at 30.
44. For a fuller discussion of this view, see infra part I1I.C.1.
45. PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM, supra note 7, at 17-26. For a review of the literature, see Marmor et
al., Procompetitive Reform, supra note 37, at 1003.
46. Alain C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, Universal Health Insurance Through Incentives Reform,
265 JAMA 2532 (1991) [hereinafter Enthoven & Kronick, Incentives Reform].
47. See Lake, supra note 5, in this volume. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (arguing that certain values cannot be reduced to market commodity terms).
48. Judith H. Hibbard & Edward C. Weeks, Consumerism in Health Care: Prevalence and Predictors,
25 MED. CARE 1019 (1987) (arguing that increasing cost sensitivity through cost-sharing does not
significantly increase informed consumer behavior); John P. Newhouse et al., How Sophisticated Are
Consumers About the Medical Care Delivery System?, 19 MED. CARE 316 (1981) (arguing that medical-care
consumers are largely uninformed to make rational choices regarding physician selection).
49. See Daniel W. Sigelman, Palm-Reading the Invisible Hand: A Critical Examination of Pro-
Competitive Reform Proposals, 6 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 578 (1982).
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while ensuring the availability of quality care to all of its citizens.S° Business-
like competition and private cost control probably cannot do so, or, at the very
least, never have."'
2. The Government Can't Do It
The myth is that Americans mistrust government and doubt that it can do
anything right. The reality is more complicated. Americans certainly are
ambivalent about government, but they yearn for it to provide them with a
sense of security. s2 Historically, Americans have turned towards government
in times of dire need (e.g., the Depression, world wars) and spurned it in
times of apparent prosperity (the 1920s, the 1980s). For the past two decades,
many of the nation's most prominent leaders have stressed government's
liabilities, not its capacities, and the media have amplified this scorn. Anti-
government rhetoric has further eroded American confidence in the ability of
its public institutions to right the obvious wrongs of American life. 3
As a result, medical-care reformers are powerfully limited in what they
can propose without having propagandistic attacks unleashed against them.
Proposals for national health insurance prompt a familiar range of counter-
charges: assertions that the United States government is too corrupt, too
captured by interest groups, and too incompetent for public health insurance
to work. Critics point derisively at the inefficiencies of the Veterans Adminis-
tration, the savings and loans scandals, bloated procurement policies at the
Department of Defense, and the disgraces at the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.54
There is, of course, some truth in these claims. The effectiveness and
quality of American government does vary. It is demonstrably competent at
some tasks, notably among them-and most relevant for the purposes of health
insurance reform-are the highly popular Social Security insurance pro-
grams."5 A clear model of incorruptibility is the Federal Reserve Board,
which is entrusted with major economic decisions without any fear of scandal
50. Theodore R. Marmot, Misleading Notions, HEALTH MGMT. Q., Fourth Quarter 1991, at 18
[hereinafter Misleading Notions].
51. Martin Pfaff, Differences in Health Care Spending Across Countries: Statistical Evidence, 15 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1, 20-22 (1990). See also Robert G. Evans et al., The 20 Year Experiment:
Accounting for, Explaining, and Evaluating Health Care Cost Containment in Canada and the United
States, ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH, October 1990 [hereinafter Evans, 20 Year Experiment].
52. See generally JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH (1990); THEODORE R. MARMOR ET
AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARESTATE (1991) [hereinafter MISUNDERSTOODWELFARE STATE].
53. See MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE, supra note 52, at 1, 242 n.2.
54. See, e.g., Alain Enthoven, Why We Can't Get Therefrom Here, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1991,
at 20 (letter to the editor) (relying on Defense Department foibles to cast doubt on government's ability
to implement national health insurance).
55. MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE, supra note 52, at 163.
238
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(though many may disagree with the wisdom of its policy judgments).56
Moreover, popular doubt about government competence may wane in the area
of medical care. Recent polls indicate that some 83% of Americans believe
that it "definitely or probably should be ... government's responsibility to
provide health care for the sick."57
3. We Can't Afford and Won't Pay for Any National Health Insurance Plan
What of America's massive budget deficits? Can we afford to increase
government outlays? Behind these questions lurks another myth: that Amer-
icans cannot (or will not) pay new taxes for a national health insurance plan.
But these myths assume that Americans do not know (or are unable to under-
stand) that year after year we are "affording" rates of increases in medical
outlays that exceed both inflation and the rate of growth in national income."8
The way we now "raise" the funds to pay for our $740 billion-plus health
budget-through taxes, direct out-of-pocket payments, insurance premiums,
and foregone wages for employer-provided insurance-makes it harder, not
easier, to choose spending levels that we can afford.59
The argument that "we simply can't afford it" states the problem back-
wards. What we are affording, but do not want, is the system we now have.
America leads the world in spending, but has a complex and fragmented
system that almost everyone finds objectionable.60 The problem is not simply
affordability. Rather, it is dissatisfaction with the value we get for our money
and the conviction of many that we could do better for less expense. Which-
ever method of fundamental reform the U.S. chooses, the combination of
universal access and some form of public constraint on the financing of
medical insurance will be critical to cost control. "What Americans have
feared as too costly," Paul Starr has noted, "has elsewhere evolved into a
system for controlling costs. "61
Critics claim the public will not pay new taxes to reform medical financing,
even if doing so would mean the elimination of most other medical expenses.
56. Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry Mashaw, Checking the Nation's Pulse: America's Health Insurance
Fever, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1991, atCl. See S. 2513, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (Daschle) (proposing
Health Board modeled on Federal Reserve) (discussed briefly infra note 194).
57. Humphrey Taylor & Uwe E. Reinhardt, Does the System Fit?, HEALTH MGMT. Q., Third Quarter
1991, at 2, 6.
58. OECD Health Database, supra note 17.
59. The nominal burden of employer-based health-care costs falls among workers in the form of lower
wages, consumers in the form of higher prices, employers in the form of premiums, and taxpayers in the
form of lost revenue to the government from deductions and exclusions. See Katherine Swartz, Why
Requiring Employers to Provide Health Insurance is a Bad Idea, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 779
(1990).
60. See Lake, supra note 5, in this volume.
61. Paul Starr, The Middle Class and National Health Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1991, at 7,
8 [hereinafter Starr, Middle Class]. See infra part Ill.
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The critics' assertion, recent polls tell us, is false.62 If one asks about specific
taxes for particular government services, public support rises rapidly.63 We
believe there would be more public support for a tax increase to finance a
universal health insurance program than for a more limited but still quite
expensive plan to bridge gaps in existing insurance arrangements. A recent
survey reported that 63 % of Americans favor increasing access to medical care
for those who do not yet have it rather than lowering the nation's health
spending, if such a choice must be made.' An oft-cited example of a pro-
gram whose purported beneficiaries refused to pay increased taxes is the
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. In fact, an analysis of the Act's demise
reveals instead calculated misinformation, poor design of an otherwise sound
program's financing, and admittedly ill-managed politics. 65 Proponents of
today's major reform proposals would be well-advised to heed the major lesson
of this year's campaign: talk straight to the American public. If Americans
reject national health insurance-and with it universal access and a likely
reduction in the overall cost of medical care-they should at least not be misled
into thinking that hiding health costs is the same as reducing them.66
4. The Entrenched Interests Are Too Powerful
American policymakers repeatedly ask if now is the time for universal
health insurance. The stunning victory of Harris Wofford in Pennsylvania, the
sheer volume of current proposals in Congress, the fact that a reluctant Presi-
62. See Lake, supra note 5, in this volume.
63. Id.
64. Robert J. Blendon, The Public's View.of the Future of Health Care, 259 JAMA 3587 (1988).
65. See Health Insurance Bill Is Enacted, 1988 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 281; Catastrophic-Coverage Law
is Repealed, 1989 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 149. The catastrophic health-care plan employed pay-as-you-go
user fees to avoid either raising "taxes" or adding to the budget deficit in the wake of Gramm-Rudman.
No attempt was made to link the increased fees with the overall Medicare program, rather than solely with
the increased catastrophic benefits. A CBO staff study concluded that 30-40% of medicare enrollees would
face new premium costs in excess of their new expected benefits under the Act. The user fee structure also
violated the social insurance concept of social security, under which financing would have come from
general payroll or income tax sources from the population as a whole. In order to build up a fund reserve,
Congress front-loaded the financing, while the benefits were to be phased in over several years. Lawrence
J. Haas, Fiscal Catastrophe, 21 NAT'L J. 2453 (1989). This gave those opposed to the legislation the
opportunity to mount a largely disingenuous campaign against the plan before any of its natural constituents
would receive any benefits. Because the fees were not placed in a separate trust fund, some slyly charged
that the surpluses were being used for general deficit reduction. Mark Hosenball, Letters Sealed with Fear:
Direct-Mail Moguls and the Catastrophic Care Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1989, at Cl. On November
21, 1989, the House (by a tally of 346-55) and the Senate (by acclamation) voted to repeal the legislation.
With Gramm-Rudman limits looming large, increased benefits stood little chance of survival without the
surtax to pay for them. Insurance companies increased the premiums on their "Medigap" policies by over
20% in 1990, at least half of which, according to the GAO, can be attributed to the repeal of catastrophic
health-care coverage. Molly Sinclair, 'Medigap' Rates Soar For Senior Citizens, WASH. POST, Jan. 26,
1990, at C1. See generally, James A. Barnes, Age-Old Strife, 23 NAT'L J. 216 (1991).
66. Marmor & Mashaw, supra note 56, at Cl.
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dent Bush was forced to come up with a plan of his own,67 and the polling
data6"-all suggest that American policymakers would be ill-advised not to
act.69
Yet some argue that even if now is the appropriate time for a national
health insurance plan, and we know how best to accomplish it, American
interest group politics will block any meaningful reform. Interest groups do,
of course, restrict political maneuverability, and the interests arrayed against
national health insurance are particularly powerful; they are well-financed, and
have concentrated stakes in avoiding financial losses. There is no way to widen
coverage and restrain costs without harming the interests of some of those
currently benefitting from our rapidly inflating health industry.7" It would be
unrealistic to believe that fundamental reform is possible without antagonizing
powerful political actors.
The fact that the medical pressure groups are powerful, however, does not
mean national health insurance is impossible to enact. Quite the contrary.71
Public support, once aroused, can be overwhelming. The undeniable fact of
1992 is that a very unusual coalition of management, labor, and citizen groups
has pushed national health insurance to the political foreground. Any funda-
mental reform will pit health insurers, as well as many doctors and hospitals,
against a variety of employers, employees, unions, the unemployed, those
locked into jobs, and those retired from jobs. The latter group will be joined
by the growing number of doctors and hospital administrators who believe that
the current system is economically and morally unacceptable. Notwithstanding
the difficulties ahead, what is essential is that our political leaders take on the
task.
II. LEARNING FROM ABROAD: DIFFERENT ROADS TO
UNIVERSAL ACCESS AND COST CONTAINMENT
Although few would argue that Americans should or could adopt a foreign
system of health insurance wholesale, we have much to learn from how others
have provided universal insurance and acceptable levels of care, while simulta-
neously achieving fiscal stability.72 "By examining other people's experi-
67. See PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM, supra note 7.
68. See Lake, supra note 5, in this volume; see also Taylor & Reinhardt, supra note 57, at 4.
69. See Lake, supra note 5, in this volume; see also Robert Kerrey, supra note 29.
70. Victor R. Fuchs, The Health Sector's Share of the Gross National Product, 247 SCIENCE 534
(1990).
71. MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE, supra note 52, at 209-12.
72. See Pfaff, supra note 51, at 1; LAURENE A. GRAIG, HEALTH OF NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON U.S. HEALTH CARE REFORM (1991); George Schieber & Jean-Pierre Poullier, Internation-
al Health Spending: Issues & Trends, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1991, at 106. See generally Symposium:
Pursuit of Health Systems Reform, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991.
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ence," Evans has noted, "you can extend your range of perceptions of what
is possible...." 73 There are two dominant models of health insurance in other
advanced industrialized countries from which we believe Americans can draw
valuable lessons. 74
A. Learning from Canada
The first model, exemplified by Canada (as well as Australia and other
nations), combines government-financed insurance with private provision of
care. Canada provides comprehensive, universal coverage to its citizens. Each
Canadian citizen has a computerized health insurance card which she simply
presents to a doctor to receive services. Canadian patients do not have to file
claims, much less deal with incomprehensible forms. Canada minimizes
administrative costs and reduces frustration through such simplified operations.
It wastes none of its medical-care dollars on eligibility determinations, insur-
ance marketing, or risk evaluations to set different premium rates.75 Canadian
patients are free to choose their physician and hospital, and their physicians
need not obtain approval from administrators for the treatment they recom-
mend. Physicians bill provincial authorities on a fee-for-service basis, and
receive payment-to the amazement of many American observers-within three
weeks .76
Canada presents a clear example of a single-payer system in operation.'
Doctors and hospitals in Canada are reimbursed from one insurance source,
a provincial ministry. Doctors who choose to remain eligible for reimburse-
ment by the provincial plan may not "extra bill" patients by charging an
amount in excess of the health plan reimbursement rate.78 Private insurance
plans may cover only those services not insured by the provincial plan. Provin-
cial governments use their monopsony power to negotiate fee schedules
73. Robert G. Evans, The Spurious Dilemma: Reconciling Medical Progress and Cost Control, 4
HEALTH MATRIX 25, 26 (1986).
74. See Paul Starr & Theodore Marmor, The United States: A Social Forecast, in THE END OF AN
ILLUSION 234, 250-51 (Jean de Kervasdoue et al. eds., 1984).
75. See CANADIAN HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 30.
76. Statementby Michael Decter, Deputy Minister of Health, Ontario Provincial Government, Toronto,
Canada (Feb. 6, 1992) (personal communication from Dr. Hugh Scully, member, Ontario Medical
Association, Committee on Fee Negotiations, Feb. 7, 1992). Canadian hospitals and other medical-care
providers save a significant amount of time and money because they do not need large billing departments
or personnel to keep track of numerous, complicated forms, eligibility determinations, or billing. CANADIAN
HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 33; Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 26, at 1253. In Canada,
doctors spend 36% of their gross income on overhead, while American doctors spend 48%. CANADIAN
HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 39.
77. Single-payer is somewhat of a misnomer, since the ten Canadian provinces, two territories, and
the federal government are each payers. Monopsony is also somewhat of a misnomer because providers
in Canada have organized into a collective bargaining unit, thus creating a bilateral monopoly between
providers and provinces.
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(uniform rates at which insurers reimburse providers) with physicians, and
global budgets (including operating and capital budgets) with hospitals. Budget
negotiations between medical-care providers and provincial health-care admin-
istrators are periodic, noisy, and contentious affairs-but unlike the negotia-
tions of private insurance companies and providers of "managed care" in the
United States, they are open to the public and therefore subject to influence
through the political process. The Canadian health insurance plan is financed
through income, payroll, and sales taxes.79
Canada's universal health insurance permits a.good deal of local variation.
The program is largely financed and wholly administered by provincial govern-
ments and is adapted to reflect local preferences.8" The federal government
does not prescribe the details of provincial administration. In order to receive
federal funding, however, the provincial programs must fulfill the five basic
principles of the Canada Health Act: They must be universal (covering all
citizens), comprehensive (covering all "medically necessary" care), accessible
to all (imposing no significant deductibles or co-payment obligations on
patients), portable (recognizing the other provinces' coverage), and publicly
administered (under the control of a public, non-profit organization). 8
Although Canadians express overall satisfaction with the quality of their
medical care, waiting lists have developed for some services, particularly for
open-heart surgery and magnetic resonance imaging.82 In response to such
problems, public outcry leads to relatively quick reforms.8 3 While the ration-
ing choices of an American HMO are private corporate affairs, 4 Canada's
decisions about spending on hospitals and other health services are publicly
debated. Queues, then, result in part from public choices about the relative
medical need for particular services, and in part from questionable managerial
79. M.L. BARER & R.G. EVANS, REFLECTION ON THE FINANCING OF HOSPITAL CAPITAL: A
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 14-18 (University of British Columbia Health Policy Research Unit Discussion
Series 1990).
80. Local financing averages 60%, but there is considerable variation from province to province. See
Robert G. Evans, The Canadian Health-Care Financing and Delivery System: Its Experience and Lessons
for Other Nations in this volume [hereinafter Canadian Health-Care]; ROBERT G. EVANS & MAUREEN
M. LAW, THE CANADIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: WHERE ARE WE; How DID WE GET HERE? 17
(University of British Columbia Health Policy Research Unit Discussion Paper Series 1991).
81. These basic principles allow for regional variation, but the Canadian Health Act ensures that major
departures from these principles result in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in federal aid. Canada Health Act,
ch. 6, § 15(1), 1984 S.C.
82. CANADIAN HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 17, 52; MICHAEL RACHLIS & CAROL KUSHNER,
SECOND OPINION: WHAT'S WRONG WITH CANADA'S HEALTH- CARE SYSTEM AND HOW TO FIX IT 1-2
(1989).
83. See C.D. Naylor, A Different View of Queues in Ontario, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991, at 110, 111;
Allan Detsky et al., Containing Ontario's Hospital Costs Under Universal Insurance in the 1980s: What
Was the Record?, 142 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 565 (1990).
84. In the United States, rationing occurs within the private sector through price, administrative pre-
clearance procedures, and utilization review. This rationing is more hidden and dispersed than in publicly
financed programs like Medicaid, Medicare, and national health insurance plans in other nations.
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choices. Mistakes are made, but the provincial agencies are highly visible
entities, held to public account for their decisions.85 The overall quality of
care in Canada appears quite high; health status indicators are comparable or
superior to those of the United States; and primary care is readily available."
In fact, Canada's overall rate of hospital and physician use per capita exceeds
that of the U.S., as does Canada's ratio of general physicians and family
practitioners to the population as a whole.87 "Patient flight" to the United
States, widely cited in the American press, actually occurs quite infrequent-
ly. 88
Before fully implementing universal health insurance in 1971, Canada
financed its medical care in roughly the same way that the United States did.
At the time, Canada spent approximately the same proportion of its gross
national product on medical care as the United States did, and its costs were
increasing at about the same rate as U.S. costs. Since 1971, Canada's health
expenditures in relation to its national income and population have essentially
stabilized in real terms while ours have steadily increased. Canada now spends
30% less of its GNP on medical care than we do, and the difference is grow-
ing. 
8 9
85. Theodore R. Marmor, Canada's Health-Care System: A Modelfor the United States?, 90 CURRENT
HIST. 422, 425 (1991); BARER & EVANS, supra note 79, at 7-12.
86. CANADIAN HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 16, 52.
87. Canada has nearly four times the number of general and family practitioners per person than does
the United States. Id. at 37. Canada's hospitals have more admissions and longer stays. Id. at 46.
88. Id. at 60; U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE, A CALL FOR ACTION:
SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PEPPER COMM'N 225-26 (1990).
89. On the debate over these numbers, see John K. Iglehart, Canada's Health Care System, 315 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 202, 778, 1623 (1986); J. Feder et al., Canada's Health System, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED.
320 (1987); Evans et al., Canadian Reality, supra note 27, at 571; Morris L. Barer et al., Canadian/U.S.
Health Care: Reflections on the HIAA 's Analysis, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991, at 229 (reviewing EDWARD
NEUSCHLER, CANADIAN HEALTH CARE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE (1990));
Edward Neuschler, Debating the Canadian System:A Response from the Author, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991,
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The U.S. General Accounting Office has estimated that a single-payer
universal health plan like Canada's, if implemented in the United States, could
provide universal coverage without co-payments or deductibles for less than
the United States currently spends for medical care, and could result in signifi-
cant long-term savings.90 While spending less, Canadians were the more
content with their medical-care arrangements. A 1989 study, for example,
showed that 56% of Canadians reported overall satisfaction compared to 10%
in the American sample. 9
B. Learning from Germany
A second model, exemplified by Germany, utilizes "all-payer" rules to
restrain costs while providing what amounts in practice to universal medical
insurance coverage. 92 Germany assures this near-universal coverage through
a complex array of 1,128 non-profit insurance organizations known as "sick-
ness funds. "3 The sickness funds act as intermediate institutions between the
ultimate payers (consumers) and the providers. The funds are financed through
premiums that are related to salary, wages, and payroll, and that vary by fund.
The federal government administers health insurance plans for the uninsured.
Retirees usually are covered by the sickness fund of their former employer.
All those who earn under $36,000 per year-approximately 75% of the
population-must participate in one of the sickness funds. Those who earn
more than that amount may either join the sickness funds or purchase private
insurance.94
The participants in the U.S. debate regularly mischaracterize the German
model as analogous to America's fragmented world of medical financing,
despite the sharp differences between private insurance firms in the United
States and the non-profit German sickness funds.95 In fact, the actors in
90. CANADIAN HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 67-68.
91. Robert J. Blendon et al., Satisfaction with Health Systems in Ten Nations, HEALTH AFF., Summer
1990, at 185, 188.
92. A system is an "all-payer" system when every person paying for a health-care service pays a price
set by the same rules.
93. John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Germany's Health Care System (pt. 2), 324 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1750, 1751 (1991). See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE SPENDING
CONTROL: THE EXPERIENCE OF FRANCE, GERMANY, & JAPAN (1991) [hereinafter THE EXPERIENCE OF
FRANCE, GERMANY & JAPAN].
94. A small minority (8%) consisting of relatively wealthy eligible Germans have opted out of the
sickness fund system; once they opt out they must remain out for the duration of their lives. These
individuals are not covered by the all-payer rules. About one-third of those eligible to opt out choose to
do so. THE EXPERIENCE OF FRANCE, GERMANY, & JAPAN, supra note 93, at 29 n. 13.
95. See, e.g., Dick Knox, Lessonsfrom a Medical System that Works, BOSTON GLOBE, May 12, 1991,
at 1 (views of the American Medical Ass'n); Dick Knox, Cost of Care Leaves Many in U.S. Seeking Better
Way, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 1991, at 1 (discussing superficial similarities). Cf. John K. Iglehart, Health
Policy Report: Germany's Health Care System (pt. 1), 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 503 (1991) (contrasting
Germany with United States).
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German medical politics are stable players in a well-structured, culturally
distinctive game."6 The German federal government steers the negotiations
between collective bargaining units of medical providers and labor-management
representatives from the sickness funds. These negotiations set fee-for-service
schedules, which are subject to regional budget limits. State governments and
th sickness funds negotiate with hospitals to set per diem reimbursement rates.
Although the German medical insurance system may appear non-
governmental, German public officials play a key coordinating role in the
complex negotiations among labor, management, and intermediary institutions
that some German experts term the "middle way. " This arrangement allows
for marginal variation among funds, but most Germans have what amounts to
the same benefits and comparable financial burdens of premium payments and
payroll taxes. Because revenue comes almost exclusively from social insurance
contributions, expenditures and accountability are reasonably transparent. Most
sickness funds today are pooled locally, regionally, nationally, and/or by
profession, rather than on the basis of individual employment. Moreover, most
German citizens remain in their sickness fund, even if an employment-related
fund, for all of their life. This hardly resembles the changing public and
private mix of insurance carriers, contracts, and coverage that marks American
health insurance.
Germany developed its system over one hundred years ago, when Bismark
coopted the arcane labor guild system.9" One liability of the German approach
is the considerable administrative expense imposed by its multiple sickness
funds. In addition, employment-based health insurance entails a nominal
distribution of the substantial costs of employee medical care to firms. 9 In
that respect, the dispute over financing health insurance through employers sets
one class of interests-insurance firms and related companies-against
another-employers trying to shed this expensive nominal component of their
labor costs. Finally, employment-based health insurance relies heavily on job
continuity in Germany; that model of universal coverage would face additional
96. Bradford L. Kirkman-Liff, Health Insurance Values and Implementation in the Netherlands and
the Federal Republic of Germany: An Alternative Path to Universal Coverage, 265 JAMA 2496 (1991).
97. Klaus Henke, Address at Comparative Medical-Care Systems Conference, Ditchley Park, England
(Mar. 20, 1992) (transcript on file with author).
98. Iglehart (pt. 1), supra note 95, at 503-05. See generally J. Matthias Graf Von Der Schulenburg,
The West German Health Care Financing and Delivery System: Its Experiences and Lessons for Other
Nations (Dec. 18, 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); J. Matthias Graf Von Der
Schulenburg, Health Care in the 1990s: A Report from Germany, in HEALTH CARE IN THE 1990s: A
GLOBAL VIEW OF DELIVERY AND FINANCING 95 (Blue Cross of Cal. ed., 1990).
99. That nominal burden in actuality falls among workers in the form of lower wages, consumers in
the form of higher prices, and employers. See Katherine Swartz, Why Requiring Employers to Provide
Health Insurance Is a Bad Idea, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 779 (1990). In any event, any system
that constrains health-care costs, including an employer-based system such as a play or pay plan with strict
all-payer rules, would be far better for competitiveness than maintenance of current medical-care arrange-
ments or reforms that failed to constrain costs.
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implementation barriers in the American context where workers often switch
jobs.
C. Financial and Administrative Lessons from Abroad: Adaptations for the
United States
No one sensibly argues that a model from abroad should or could simply
be imported into the United States. But Americans can learn from countries
like Canada and Germany which, with very different institutional arrange-
ments, have managed to constrain costs, universalize coverage, and maintain
satisfactory levels of quality in medical care.
1. Principles
Five principles have gained wide acceptance abroad and provide useful
guidance for medical-care reform in the United States:
o Universal insurance coverage for all Americans;
o Comprehensive, broad coverage of ordinary medical care, compre-
hensibly formulated and described;
o Concentration of financial responsibility and political accountability to
control costs;
o Freedom to choose providers and provider-patient autonomy in medical
treatment decisionmaking; and,
o Portable rights to insurance not contingent on a specific job or geo-
graphic location.
Each of these principles can only be sketched briefly here.
a. Universality. Insurance coverage for all Americans is essential for
several reasons. Universality avoids the problem of "free riders"-uninsured
patients who receive care others have to finance. If accompanied by some form
of fee limits, broad coverage helps prevent cost-shifting from patients who will
not or cannot pay higher medical prices to patients who will and can pay
higher prices, a practice that thwarts cost-control strategies. Universal protec-
tion (in the same or similar plans) means as well that American voters would
concentrate their political attention on the cost, quality, comprehensiveness and
efficiency of the national health insurance program instead of dispersing it on
the countless, fragmented insurance organizations they now separately face.
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b. Comprehensive Benefits. Benefits must be both comprehensive and
comprehensible for health insurance to be regarded as a reliable source of
economic security. Even those Americans who have insurance worry that the
fine print of their plans will rob them of insurance protection precisely when
they need it most. Comprehensive, understandable benefits promote other aims
as well: reducing wasteful bureaucratic hassle, eliminating cost-shifting," 0
and promoting autonomy in the choice of providers and in the medical deci-
sions that doctors make with patients.
c. Political Accountability. Politically accountable administrative and
financial decisionmakers appear to be the sine qua non of effective cost
control. Our fragmented system for financing medical care leads cost-conscious
players to address their own program's costs, not the costs of American
medicine. Cost-shifting makes it quite difficult to achieve any overall cost
restraint. Like squeezing a balloon, efforts to control one's own costs by cost-
shifting to others spreads costs around rather than containing them."10
Without political accountability, medical providers over the past two
decades increased their prices and fees while consumers and payers had no
means to limit total outlays. The result, predictably, has been persistent
medical inflation.0 2 Countervailing buyer power, comparative research
shows, has been the necessary (though insufficient) condition for balancing
inflationary forces in modern medicine."°3 When combined with political
accountability, this buying power can offset the medical-care industry's obvious
cultural authority and informational advantages.
Political accountability involves, in part, making medical-care expenditures
visible to the public. Public financing through earmarked provincial premiums
and federal and provincial taxes make Canadian health outlays highly visible.
Politically visible financing in the American context may mean that individual
Americans, instead of paying a mix of out-of-pocket expenses, premiums for
health insurance, and direct and indirect taxes, would pay explicit premiums
100. Plans with incomplete benefits coverage can increase cost-shifting because, to the extent
uncovered-but-necessary services are nevertheless provided, someone other than the insurer will in fact
pay for that service-whether the consumer, the provider, or another patient who is charged more by the
provider to "compensate" for lost revenue to that provider from the uncovered service.
101. Federal efforts to restrain increases in the cost of Medicare and Medicaid, for example, do not
appear to have significantly restrained medical inflation overall. Such restraints may have sometimes
resulted in the denial of care to the poor because many providers refuse to treat patients at those rates; other
providers shift costs to other payers through higher service fees in an attempt to recoup perceived "losses"
incurred in treating poorer patients. President Bush's initial proposal to reduce payments in the Medicaid
and Medicare systems to pay for tax credits for health insurance would shift costs and reduce access for
the poor and elderly rather than constrain costs overall. See infra part III.C. 1.
102. See Theodore R. Marmor, American Health Politics, 1970 to the Present: Some Comments, Q.
REV. ECON. & Bus., Winter 1990, at 32, 37 [hereinafter Marmor, American Health Politics].
103. Id. at 35 (citing examples of Britain, Canada, and France). See also Pfaff, supra note 51, at 21-
22. How such countervailing power works to restrain costs, we leave to part III.D.
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to a universal health insurance program. In the aggregate, Americans could
well pay less for a sensible national health insurance program than they pay
under present arrangements. 1" Federal premiums could be earmarked, or
set aside in a trust fund, to assure Americans that their medical-care dollars
are going only to that program.1 5 What is more important than the precise
method of the levy is that the financing be publicly debated and publicly
negotiated.
d. Free Choice of Providers. Most Americans want the freedom to choose
their doctors and other medical-care professionals without interference, whether
from health maintenance organizations. (HMOs), insurance companies, or the
government. Moreover, American doctors understandably want freedom to
provide care without distracting second-guessing or pre-clearance proce-
dures. "
e. Portability. There are good reasons for not tying medical insurance to
employment. The lack of portable coverage locks workers into jobs some
would rather leave. It makes others fearful that if they lose their job, they also
will lose their health insurance. It further concentrates risks and costs in
relatively small groups. Particularly in a context of low union membership and
fewer long-term relationships between workers and employers, 7 linking
insurance to employment makes far less sense than in earlier decades.
2. American Values
As we have shown, the political debate over medical-care reform is clut-
tered with numerous myths about the American philosophy of medical care
financing and administration. Contrary to the rhetoric of many medical interest
groups, it is the values of universal health insurance that resonate with Ameri-
can traditions, not those expressed by our contemporary arrangements. As Uwe
Reinhardt and Humphrey Taylor have shown: "The American health-care
system does not match American values"; it does not reflect "the ideology or
104. CANADIAN HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 67-68.
105. See, e.g., H.R. 1300 (Russo); H.R. 650 (Stark); H.R. 2535 (Waxman); S. 1177 (Rockefeller)
(all bills from 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
106. See Herzlinger, supra note 30, at 69; Humphrey Taylor et al., Physicians' Responses to Their
Changing Environment, in SYSTEM IN CRISIS, supra note 5, at 149.
107. Thierry Noyelle, Toward a New Labor Market Segmentation, in SKILLS, WAGES, AND PRODUC-
TIVITY IN THE SERVICE SECTOR 212 (Thierry Noyelle ed., 1990). Linking insurance to employment made
much more sense from the 1920s to the early 1970s (an era of firm-specific internal labor markets), when
it was useful to employers as a worker-bonding device and in a social sense as a means of identifying large,
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social ethic of most Americans.'l1 Despite much protestation to the con-
trary,"°1 American medical values do not differ significantly from those of
citizens in other industrial democracies. Large majorities of Americans, for
example, believe that no one should be allowed to be bankrupted by high
medical costs; that the poor and the unemployed should have access to the
same care, when equally sick, as the rest of the population; that people with
heart conditions or cancer should not pay more for health insurance than those
who are healthy; and that government should ensure that everyone gets the
medical care he or she needs.' It is absurd to assume that the system we
now have is the one we want simply because we have it.' The system we
have reflects bargains, anticipated and unanticipated outcomes, and shifting
victories for particular parties and interest groups-none of it neat, simple, or
satisfying. 1
12
Any national plan for universal insurance would require adaptation to
American circumstances. For most industrial democracies, universalization of
coverage has meant socialized sickness insurance, not socialized medicine. 3
National health insurance relies not only on the pooling of community risks
but also on individual responsibility." 4 Sensibly designed, national health
insurance is compatible with considerably greater autonomy for physicians and
patients than Americans now experience. It permits the expression of voice-
democratic accountability and robust public debate-to guide medical-care
decisions now made by fragmented corporate actors and providers.' Final-
ly, national health insurance avoids stratifying the delivery of medical care
108. Taylor & Reinhardt, supra note 57, at 2, 5.
109. See, e.g., John Holahan et al., An American Approach to Health System Reform, 265 JAMA 2537
(1991) (asserting that Canadian health-care system is probably too egalitarian for the United States).
110. Taylor & Reinhardt, supra note 57, at 4.
111. Eli Ginzberg has argued that after World War II, Americans obtained the health-care system that
"they wanted and were willing to pay for," and that "Itihere is no evidence that the American people want
to change this system." Eli Ginzberg, U.S. Health Care Policy in 1990: Looking Back, Looking Ahead,
30 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus., Winter 1990, at 15, 21.
112. Marmor, American Health Politics, supra note 102, at 40.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON HEALTH SERVICES 3-4 (1964).
115. On the concept of influencing public institutions through the options of public criticism and
participation (voice), opting out (exit), and changing from within (loyalty), see ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, ExTr,
VOICE & LOYALTY (1970).
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according to ability to pay. Like Social Security, national health insurance
complements America's version of an insurance-opportunity welfare state."6
The alleged uniqueness of American values is largely pressure group propagan-
da.
117
III. MEDICAL-CARE FINANCING AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
A. Competing Approaches
At the heart of the reform debate in America lie two fundamentally differ-
ent approaches to controlling medical-care costs while expanding insurance
coverage to all Americans.
1. Micro-Economic Medical-Care Decisionmaking
One approach, guided by neo-classical micro-economics, presumes that
there is insufficient price competition in medicine and that first-dollar insurance
(without cost-sharing) induces wasteful and financially costly patient
demands. 8 This view appeals especially to conventional economists like
Mark Pauly," 9 organizations like the Heritage Foundation, 20 and pro-market
advocates within the Bush Administration.' The solution requires economic
disincentives to seek care: deductibles and co-payments to reduce patient
demand, and monitoring the services supplied to counteract the expansionary
incentives of fee-for-service medicine. The model also prescribes micro-level,
decentralized adjustments to determine the provision and expense of medical
care. In this analysis, the point of contact between provider and patient
116. Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey have characterized American social welfare programs, including
Social Security, as embodying two core principles: social insurance (the pooling of common risks) and the
promotion of economic opportunity. MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE, supra note 52, at 31-46.
117. See Misleading Notions, supra note 50, at 18, 23-24; Theodore Marmor, U.S. Medical Care
System: Why Not the Worst?, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1991, at A15.
118. By first-dollar coverage, we mean insurance policies that do not use deductibles (payments
required of patients before insurance reimbursement begins).
119. Mark Pauly et al., A Plan for 'Responsible National Health Insurance', HEALTH AFF., Spring
1991, at 5. Pauly has argued that the emergence of HMOs and managed care has made it more appropriate
to analyze health care as if it were an ordinary commodity. See also Mark Pauly, Is Medical Care
Different? Old Questions, New Answers, 13 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 227 (1988).
120. See A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR AMERICA (Stuart Butler & Edmund Haislmaier eds.,
1989).
121. See PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM, supra note 7, at 31-44.
122. In contrast, we argue that in the current U.S. system, because of the inherent information
asymmetry between provider and patient, and with cost-shifting and free ridership, providers can drive
medical-care costs too high. The asymmetry of information is inherent in the doctor-patient relationship
and is not a function of rational ignorance caused by the absence of accurate price signals. The problems
of cost-shifting and free ridership are inherent in any non-mandatory, non-universal health insurance plan.
We argue that only systems which create a financing structure that increases the relative bargaining power
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becomes the proper place not only for decisions about the provision of care,
but also about its financing."2
Ironically, most "pro-competitive" reformers propose extraordinarily
complex regulatory schemes that impose restrictions on practitioners and
patients, are not likely to be implemented as planned, and, in any event, will
not have the positive payoffs these advocates claim.124 American patients and
doctors now rank among the most highly regulated in the world precisely
because of efforts by governments, employers, and private insurers to cope
with the market's fragmented distribution of cost-containing efforts.
2. Macro-Political Medical-Care Decisionmaking
An ideologically opposite approach underlies the financing and administra-
tive arrangements of health insurance in most other industrial democracies.
Nations like Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and Japan set up
negotiations between providers and payers in a manner that increases the
bargaining power of the latter."2 In Canada, for instance, negotiations take
place regularly between provincial governments (acting on behalf of taxpayers
and patients) and medical organizations (like hospitals or physician groups).
In Germany, the government sets strict guidelines for fee schedules and
hospital budgets, and then permits some marginal variation among sickness
funds in premiums and benefit supplements. In both cases, the aim is not to
reduce services by either raising the out-of-pocket cost of care to patients
(through cost-sharing) or by second-guessing providers (with utilization reviews
to settle what gets paid for). Rather, the goal is to constrain the overall costs
of services provided on the basis of individual doctor-patient consultation. In
this analysis, the doctor's office is the proper forum for decisions about appro-
priate care, but not for decisions about financing. These decisions are made
collectively and publicly.
Ironically, the second approach, while calling for a more unified gov-
of purchasers of health-care services can effectively control costs.
123. An important variant of this approach is associated with the series of proposals Alain Enthoven
of Stanford has made over the past fifteen years. Enthoven begins with a similar diagnosis of the causes
of inflation, but recommends price competition among insurance intermediaries, rather than price competi-
tion at the point of provision of care, as the right remedy. He more realistically assumes that potential
patients can choose organizations to bargain on their behalf more knowledgeably than they can figure out
whether paying out-of-pocket for deductibles and co-insurance is worth the expected medical benefits. See
Enthoven & Kronick, Incentives Reform, supra note 46, at 2532.
124. See Lynk, supra note 8, at 625.
125. For descriptions of medical-care financing systems in these nations, see Naoki Ikegami, Japanese
Health Care: Low Cost Through Regulated Fees, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991, at 87; Stuart Altman & Terri
Jackson, Health Care in Australia: Lessons from Down Under, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991, at 129; Health
Insurance Values and Implementation in the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, 265 JAMA
2496 (1991); Evans et al., Canadian Reality, supra note 27, at 571. On Great Britain, see Rudolph Klein,
The Political Price of Successful Cost Containment: The Case of Britain 's NHS, in HEALTH CARE IN THE
90s: A GLOBAL VIEW OF DELIVERY AND FINANCE 77 (Blue Cross of Cal ed., 1990).
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ernment structure, presumes a more modest view of government's ability to
intervene at the level of micro-economic, medical decisions about the provision
of care. Instead, for example, the Canadian government sets the general rules
of the game, provides the public with a collective, accountable mechanism to
monitor provision and financing of care, and negotiates budgets and fees.
Within those overall constraints, doctors and patients are then free to make
their choices.
In reality, American decisionmakers do not face a stark choice between
"competition" on the one hand and "regulation" on the other. Their real
dispute is over what mix of regulation and competition will best promote cost
control, equity, access, and quality of care.126 The "pro-competitive" ap-
proach taken by the Heritage Foundation focuses on price competition among
providers. The Enthoven proposal emphasizes competition among a small
number of insurers but rejects patient-shopping among competitive hospitals
and doctors as a cost-control strategy. The macro-political approach presumes
competition among providers on the basis of quality, and relies on administered
budgets and negotiated prices to restrain inflation.
B. The Political and Programmatic Consequences of Ideology
The political myths described in Part One can easily distort the political-
legislative process-drafting of bills and negotiations over their provisions.
Because legislators must pay attention to these supposed truths while working
on legislative proposals, they often make concessions to myths. Reform
proposals-even ones that set out to be transformative-all too often combine
irreconcilable ways to provide and finance health care. Admittedly, the authors
are not agnostic about which route towards reform makes the most sense in
the American context. We find most of the pro-competitive proposals unpersua-
sive. We also believe that Canadian-style national health insurance would more
likely produce universal coverage and cost control in the United States than
would a modified German version of universal access by the aggregation of
numerous non-profit sickness funds. Nevertheless, either of the latter two
routes, coherently structured and properly administered, would assure universal
access to better insurance protection at lower cost than our current arrange-
ments or modest tinkering. Both strategies offer serious reform alternatives.
Yet, whichever approach legislators choose, they must avoid confusing tinker-
ing with steps (even small ones) forward.
Some reformers want changes in medical-care finance, but would settle for
126. See Theodore R. Marmor, American Medical Policy and the "Crisis" of the Welfare State: A
Comparative Perspective, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 617, 629 (1986). See also Donald R. Cohodes,
Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Musings on the Regulation/Competition Dialogue 7 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 54 (1982).
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partial adjustments in the rules of medical malpractice and insurance underwrit-
ing. " ' Others like the Heritage Foundation press for financing to be shifted
from employers to individuals through changes in the tax code, in order to
discourage what they regard as excessively generous benefits.12 Still others,
like Congressmen Stark and Gibbons, want to use Medicare as the basis of
reform, extending its benefits to everyone. These efforts conflict in a number
of ways, though it is quite possible that legislators would, in the course of
complex bargaining, end up with elements of all three. For example, suppose
that in 1993 the Congress, unable to agree on an overall reform of medical-care
financing, changed the tax laws to limit deductions for employer-provided
health insurance, extended Medicare in marginal ways, and required health
insurance firms to ignore pre-existing conditions in selling policies, but did not
require community rating for health insurance. The resulting aggregation of
changes would likely have these effects:
1. The political momentum for universalizing coverage while changing the
fundamental financing rules would be substantially dissipated while inflationary
pressures would increase.
2. Insurance firms would face both competition in rates (experience-rating)
and restrictions on whom they could legally exclude on the basis of risk. The
forces of competition would, in the presence of increased inflation, drive risk
selection (avoiding those more likely to use medical care) underground. In
short, these changes would increase, not decrease, the incentives to avoid those
most at risk for substantial medical expenses.
3. The changes in tax laws would reduce the generosity of coverage
without much effect on the determinants of medical inflation. That would mean
increased total expenditures at the very time political support was mobilized-a
sure recipe for disappointment.
In the United States, perceived political constraints have led to a stalemate
in health policy. This situation arises in part from American constitutional
design and in part from current political practice. 129 In the American version
of liberal democracy, politicians never know if they have enough votes for a
particular legislative proposal. Coalitions form and generate endless varieties
of proposals. The combination of agreed-upon medical-care financing ills and
imagined or real political constraints has brought us an array of reform propos-
als. For example, the perceived constraint that reform must build upon current
employer-based health insurance guides many plans. Yet our current insurance
arrangements did not come about because they perfectly mirror American
127. See, e.g., H.R. 3516, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Kyl) (malpractice reform); S. 1872, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Bentsen) (underwriting).
128. Butler, Tax Reform Strategy, supra note 8, at 2541.
129. J. Ian Morrison, Visions, Values, & Impediments, 13 HEALTH MGMT. Q., Third Quarter 1991,
at 15, 17-18.
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beliefs and desires. We stumbled upon employer-based insurance partly
because during World War II wages were strictly controlled and fringe benefits
were less tightly regulated. 3° There is very little evidence that Americans
prefer the employer-based aspect of our present arrangements, rather than the
tax-subsidy aspects of it. There are, however, some who incorrectly believe
that when employers pay for health insurance, workers have not really paid
for it in reduced wages.
Presumed constraints affect the details of specific proposals as well. For
example, reform plans often incorporate co-payments designed, theoretically,
to reduce patient demand,' but which also permit the purchase of private
insurance to cover co-payments. This combination, of course, sharply reduces
the cost-containment benefit that patient charges are meant to produce. The
concession to private insurance for co-payments proceeds from both a frank
acknowledgement that co-payments are unpopular and a political judgment that
leaving market opportunities for private health insurance firms will reduce the
number of opponents to reform within the insurance industry. We suggest that
two flawed reforms will never make a good one. Such scenarios illustrate how
important it is to examine reform provisions in logically related steps and to
understand the tradeoffs, politically and substantively, among strategies of
reform. This in turn highlights the significance of differing strategies for
balancing cost, quality, and access in medical care.
In evaluating plans for health-care reform, we first distinguish among the
problems to which the proposals are differentially directed and then classify
the proposed solutions as tinkering, steps forward, or fundamental reform. For
example, we argue that proposals to increase tax credits for health insurance,
tinkering par excellence, are incomparable to comprehensive plans that univer-
salize health insurance coverage and transform how financial resources are
raised and providers are paid. Second, we differentiate among three ideal types
of fundamental reform: (1) competitive insurers and medical-care providers
within a system of universal insurance; (2) universal plans that use all-payer
regulations to constrain costs; and (3) universal programs that constrain costs
through global budgets and negotiated fee schedules. We then analyze a
number of specific reform proposals, paying particular attention to the degree
and manner in which they fall short of the ideal-types to which they aspire.
In evaluating the current proposals, we also highlight some of the incompatible
130. Even before World War II, American employers experimented with employer-sponsored health
insurance as an instrument of personnel policy. In 1942, when the War Labor Board decided that employee
fringe benefits up to 5% of wages would not be considered inflationary, employers increased fringe
benefits, including health insurance, to attract and retain workers. The great expansion of employer-
sponsored health insurance did not occur until after World War II, when unions gained the right to bargain
for health benefits. STARR, supra note 14, at 311.
131. Moreover, politically, these cost-sharing "taxes" on the sick reduce what would show upon the
public budget as new outlays for any universal health insurance plan.
256
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components of individual plans.
Many health insurance reforms that merely tinker with the current system
are put forward as if they were substitutes for real steps towards fundamental
reorganization. Such plans focus, for example, on how to cover the presently
uninsured, or how to change the rules of medical malpractice or insurance
underwriting. Tinkering proposals are often justified by claims that we need
to retain the outstanding features of American medicine.132 It is important
to distinguish obstructionist rationales for tinkering from the valid claim that
American politics will not easily permit a single step to universal health
insurance. In Part Four of this essay, we discuss what steps, over time, would
produce movement towards an ultimate desired goal. The problem with the
"tinkering" proposals is that they promise real reform, but provide few reliable
benefits to the American public, distract policymakers from more serious
work, and consume large sums of the political capital required to transform
America's financing of health insurance.'
133
C. Reforming the Private Insurance Market through Tax Changes or
Underwriting Regulations
1. Tax Credit Plans
A number of reform plans rely on expanding health insurance coverage
through tax incentives, whether credits, deductions, or changes in who receives
such subsidies. While the details vary, the approach is similar: use the tax
system to make health insurance more affordable or to distribute more fairly
the financial burden of expanding coverage. In this section, we will discuss
three variants of this approach: the 1991 plan of the Senate Republicans, the
Bush Administration's proposal of February 1992, and the Heritage Founda-
tion's proposal for mandatory health insurance with tax reform.
Senator Chaffee and his Republican colleagues on the "GOP Task Force"
introduced their reform proposal in the summer of 1991: a plan to increase
access to health insurance through tax credits and deductions for small business
employees, the self-employed, and those with incomes up to 200% of the
poverty line. The plan relies on tax incentives to encourage more widespread
132. President Bush's health proposal takes this tack, and at the same time highlights the alleged failure
of "nationalized systems" of medical care. PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM, supra note 7, at 69-77.
133. See, e.g., Julie Kosterlitz, Health Reform Divides Democrats, NAT'L J., Sept. 21, 1991, at 2298.
Numerous bills propose minor adjustments in the Medicare program, but we discuss none of them here.
H.R. 1334 would eliminate the 24-month waiting period for Medicare benefits for the disabled. H.R. 3205
and S. 1669 would allow early retirees to obtain Medicare coverage. H.R. 1444, H.R. 1492 and H.R. 2375
would allow the unemployed to purchase Medicare coverage. Proposals that would expand Medicaid include
H.R. 290, H.R. 1391, H.R. 1392, S. 4, S. 902, S. 1211, H.R. 96, H.R. 1211, and H.R. 3410. All of
the preceding bills were introduced in the 102d Congress, 1st Session (1991).
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enrollment in health maintenance organizations. In addition, the bill makes
insurance more affordable for small businesses through regulatory changes.
It also offers federal matching funds to states that create insurance programs
for poor people not eligible for Medicaid. The Chaffee bill, like that of
President Bush, makes changes in malpractice liability a central part of its
reform strategy.' 34
President Bush's health reform plan also centers on tax credits and deduc-
tions to assist in the purchase of health insurance.' 35 Poor families not on
Medicaid could receive up to $3,750 in tax credits, while families with in-
comes up to $80,000 could receive some form of tax deductions.' 36 Such
subsidies would barely cover the annual cost of insurance for an average,
healthy family of four. The insurance cost for the same family when one
member is chronically sick is nearly three times that amount.
Beyond the tax credits, deductions, and vouchers, the Bush plan is a
collection of more modest reforms, wrapped in exaggerated claims. For
example, the plan requires states to develop basic health insurance packages
and create small business risk pools, and allows states to combine current
Medicaid funding with new tax credits to develop a single plan for low-income
residents. The plan also calls for tort reform.
The Republican response to the heightened policy competition of recent
months is remarkable. President Bush has proposed, however reluctantly, a
$100 billion expansion of federal expenditures.' 37 His plan also acknowledges
most of the problems in health insurance practice that critics have attacked:
pre-existing conditions, the lack of open enrollment, inadequate spreading of
the risks of those most likely to use medical care extensively, and so on. All
of this reflects a substantial change in the President's presumptions of what
is required and possible.
Both the Bush and Chaffee tax credit plans, however, make rather reluctant
steps towards universal health insurance. They were slow in coming, do not
assure universal protection, and clearly were brought forward only after bolder
Democratic reforms introduced in the spring of 1991 had assumed unexpected
political prominence.' 38 They fail to address seriously the underlying causes
of medical inflation and that alone qualifies them as steps in the wrong direc-
134. S. 1936, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See also H.R. 3084, 102d Cong., 1st Sess (1991) (would
expand current health insurance credit available to qualified families (only $426 in 1991), and limit the
amount of health benefits that employees may deduct from income).
135. PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM, supra note 7.
136. Michael Wines, Bush Unveils Plan for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at Al.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Its Eye on Election, White House to Propose Health Care Changes, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at A20. The rhetoric of the Bush Administration's health-care policy is also
instructive. In touting his own plan, Bush referred to that of Marty Russo as "socialized medicine." Wines,
supra note 13, at A9.
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tion.'39 Any increase in financial access, in the absence of cost-containment
policies, would worsen the very inflation that has itself prompted much of the
reform movement. Moreover, the tax credits and vouchers would be too
modest to finance comparatively expensive individual and small group policies,
and offer no catastrophic protection.
The most noticed feature of the Bush plan is its failure to specify what new
revenue would pay for the $100 billion in new outlays. The President originally
had planned to pay for the plan by slowing increases in Medicaid and Medi-
care. 40 Not only would such financing mechanisms be insufficient to finance
the new program, but they also would result in denial of care to the poor and
the elderly as a means of paying for the tax credits and vouchers. Congression-
al Republicans prevailed on the President at the last minute to leave these cuts
out of his proposal.' 4
The tax credit plan of the pro-market Heritage Foundation, while sharing
the tax incentive feature of the Bush Administration's reform approach, is a
much more fundamental reform proposal.' 42 The Heritage approach to fi-
nancing universal health insurance and to controlling costs reflects a distinctive
disciplinary and ideological orientation. It bears all the markings of neoclassi-
cal micro-economic theory and conventional public finance. Heritage diagnoses
American medical care as suffering from market failures in the private health
insurance industry. Thus, to remedy the problem of free ridership in the
current voluntary system, Heritage calls for universality through mandating
the purchase of health insurance. The legal requirement that everyone be
insured is in fact common to practically every system of national health
insurance. The Heritage plan, however, differs from other universal insurance
programs in that mandatory purchase rather than compulsory taxes (whether
social insurance levies or other taxes) serves as its finance instrument. Consis-
tent with conventional public finance theory about subsidizing government
intervention to correct market failures, Heritage proposes a financing plan that,
in combination with the benefits provided, would be distributionally progres-
sive. Accordingly, Heritage proposes refundable tax credits that would be
139. For a critique of the Bush proposal from those advocating different tax reform, see Tax Credits
for Health: Wrong Rx, supra note 10, at A18 (arguing that tax credit plans will not constrain costs and
insurance complexity will prevent comparison shopping); A Tax Cap, to Cap Costs, supra note 10, at A16
(proposes limiting employee's tax deduction for employer-provided health plans as means of cost control).
140. Robert Pear, Bush Health Plan Would Be Financed by Medicare Curb, N.Y. T1MES, Feb. 3,
1992, at AI; David E. Rosenbaum, Making a Difference/Tax Time 1992, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992,
at C12 (proposal by Richard G. Darman, Director, Office of Management and Budget).
141. Mary Jane Fisher, Benefit Buyers Hit Bush Health Plan, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Property
& Casualty/Risk & Benefits Management Edition, Feb. 17, 1992, at 1; Bush Offers $100 Billion Reform
Plan Using Tax Benefits to Expand Coverage, 19 Pension Rep. (BNA) 243 (1992); Tom Hamburger, Big
Business Upset With Bush Health Reforms, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Feb. 7, 1992, at D1.
142. See Butler, Tax Reform Strategy, supra note 8, at 2541.
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related to the proportion of one's income spent on medical care.143 Grounded
in neoclassical micro-economic theory, the Heritage Foundation's proposal
seeks to foster cost-conscious shopping in the insurance market through
reliance on out-of-pocket patient payment to ration the use of medical services.
The structure of the tax credits would, for instance, favor purchase of plans
with higher levels of co-insurance and deductibles. In favoring high cost-shar-
ing, Heritage applies ordinary micro-economic reasoning about the purchase
of commodities to medical-care allocation. In addition, by concentrating on
plans that insure against catastrophic medical expenses, the Heritage plan
further exemplifies conventional economic analysis that the "proper aim" of
insurance is to protect against catastrophic, as opposed to everyday, medical
expenses.
Finally, taking its micro-economic premises to their logical conclusion,
Heritage advocates the elimination of current tax subsidies for health insurance.
At the very least, Heritage calls for capping the deductibility of employer-
provided insurance.'" This measure would force everyone to pay for health
insurance with after-tax dollars, as we noted above, to foster more "cost
conscious" shopping in the insurance market. 45 The Heritage proposal does
recognize that this newly structured market would require some regulation. The
plan would require states to establish risk pools for especially hard-to-cover
cases and, to maintain an adequate supply of insurance policies, states would
be required to enforce a number of market-protecting regulations.
Typical of the pro-market thinking of American conservatives, the Chaffee,
Bush, and Heritage Foundation proposals rely on a common explanation of
America's present troubles. They blame spiralling health costs not so much
on health insurers or providers, but on misguided patients overly insured at
work. "Free" health insurance, like any other free good, is to the market mind
an overused good. Americans, they argue, have an understandable, but insatia-
ble appetite for seemingly "free," first-dollar insurance coverage.
Leaving aside for the moment the incorrect assumptions of this economic
theory,'" if tax credits are left as low as proposed in the various "pro-
143. See id. at 2541. A refundable tax credit is one that the government will pay regardless of whether
one earns enough money to pay at least as much in taxes as is provided by .the credit. A refundable tax
credit thus subsidizes the working poor.
144. Under the current tax structure, the expenses of employer-sponsored health insurance are both
tax deductible to the firm, 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a) (1988 & West Supp. 1992), Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10, and
excluded from the employee's total income for tax purposes, 26 U.S.C.A. § 106 (1988 & West Supp.
1992). That exclusion costs the federal government over $48 billion in foregone revenues every year. See
also Michael Kinsley, A Right-Wing Plan to Soak the Rich, WASH. POST, July 12, 199.1, at A19 (evaluating
Heritage Foundation proposal).
145. This assumption is quite heroic. Pfaff, supra note 51, at 10; BARER & EVANs, supra note 79;
Cf Hibbard & Weeks, supra note 48, at 1019; Newhouse et al., supra note 48, at 316.
146. Cost-sharing has the potential to lead to inflationary pressures rather than, or even in addition
to, reduced utilization rates. This is so because, given information and authority asymmetries in the doctor-
patient relationship, doctors can "induce" patient demand for a given service. Physician-induced demand
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competitive" plans, they will result in denial of care to some sick people. Yet,
if the credits are made more generous, without countervailing monopsonistic
bargaining power, medical inflation most likely will rise at even faster rates.
Moreover, the government will end up financing a large part of that increased
health insurance bill through lost taxes. The so-called competitive plans rely
on an altered insurance market to allocate care to the sick, presume that citizen
demands explain most ills of the medical industry, and hold little prospect,
even if politically desirable, of constraining future costs.
These plans-gone-awry, in our judgment, reflect a misguided emphasis on
euphemistically termed "managed care" and a misplaced focus on patient cost-
sharing. Managed care can result in some savings, but reliance on these cost-
control efforts themselves is administratively expensive, and "only a minority
of companies think that they have been effective. Furthermore, no slowdown
in total health-care spending is detectable over the period when managed care
has come into widespread use."147
In addition, insurance market reforms that rely on cost-sharing assume that
a major cause of cost escalation is consumer "moral hazard," that is, the
notion that consumers seek care that they do not really need because they do
not have to pay for it directly. 4 ' It is unlikely that consumers view hospital
stays-as opposed to health-as a good to be sought out. In any event, OECD
data, "do not support the claim that higher consumer payments and cost-
sharing-or more generally, more market-type pricing-would lead to lower
health expenditures per capita or as a share of GDP."149 Indeed, such data
"clearly contradict the theoretical propositions derived from micro-economic
demand theory about the rationing function of prices and cost-sharing." 150
In addition, cost-sharing unacceptably rations medical care by ability to
pay.15'
coupled with cost-sharing would thus lead to higher prices rather than reduced utilization. On physician-
induced demand, see HENRY J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION 14-16 (1991). On the
inflationary impact of such physician-induced demand, see sources cited supra note 80.
147. AARON, supra note 146, at 117 (citing William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current
Cost-Containment Strategies: Why They Can Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257 JAMA 220, 220-24
(1987)); William B. Schwartz & Daniel N. Mendelson, Hospital Cost Containment in the 1980s: Hard
Lessons Learned and Prospects for the 1990s, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1037, 1037-1042 (1991).
148. Pfaff, supra note 51, at 10.
149. Id. at 14.
150. Id. at 20.
151. Another indicator of the current medical economy-the supply of providers-is further evidence
that the medical-care market is not curable by altered economic incentives alone. Would increasing the
supply of lawyers reduce the amount of costly and needless litigation? Even the most ardent supporters
of competition would generally acknowledge that more lawyers create more litigation. The same appears
to be the case for doctors. Sharp increases in physician supply have strengthened the pressures for increased
utilization and expenditures over recent decades. Canadian physician supply, for example, has increased
by over 70% in the last two decades, with the supply of physicians exceeding the growth in population
by 2.3 % per year. Fascinatingly, this rate of growth in physician numbers practically matches the increased
per capita utilization of medical-care services over the same period. A belief that excess numbers of
physicians will restrain expenditures is, according to cross-national evidence, a very serious and expensive
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In sum, the prescriptions of the market ideologues rest on a number of
mythological assumptions. An imperfectly competitive market has not led to
cost restraint or universal access. A perfectly competitive market for medical
care in a market fraught with asymmetric information and biased risk selection
is impossible. Medical care is not just another commodity like auto-
mobiles."5 2 Obtaining hospital care "is hardly like shopping for a new car.
It is more like looking for a tow truck and a mechanic at 2:00 A.M. on a
deserted road in the middle of nowhere. You take what you can get, you do
what they say, and you pay what they charge."' 53
Even if such a perfect market for medical care were possible, it would be
undesirable in many respects as a way to allocate and finance medical care.
Market allocation restrains consumption at an unacceptable price for most
Americans: rationing needed care by ability to pay while wasting a good deal
of money on administrative complexity. A recent survey reported that nine out
of ten Americans believe that "everybody should have the right to get the best
possible [medical] care" and that 66% of Americans think it is unfair that some
people can afford better health insurance than others.154 In another survey,
63 % stated that they "favor making [medical] care more available to everyone
who does not yet have it rather than lowering the nation's health-care spend-
ing," if such a choice must be made.'55
Some plans labeled "pro-competitive," at least in theory, have some chance
of success in restraining costs while expanding financial access. Perhaps the
foremost among these approaches is the one proposed by Alain Enthoven.
5 6
Enthoven's approach, while often described as "pro-competitive," actually
seeks to develop an oligopolistic health insurance market. Enthoven advocates
empowering a small number of purchasing agents (large employers and state-
created "public sponsors") to select a small number of insurance plans among
which its employees or members must choose. Enthoven's plan is far from
unfettered competition. Rejecting the model of price-conscious patients shop-
ping around for doctors and hospitals, Enthoven favors strictly regulating
consumer choice of insurance plans and relies on the oligopoly power of
sponsors and competition among a limited number of insurers to restrain
medical inflation.
mistake. See Evans, 20 Year Experiment, supra note 51, at 496, 504.
152. See Herzlinger, supra note 30, at 69 (arguing that, with reform, consumers could shop around
for medical care in similar ways to shopping for an automobile); Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical Care Different?
Old Questions, NewAnswers, 13 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 227, 235 (1988) (arguing that medical care
is becoming more like any other commodity).
153. Ted Marmor& David Boyum,Affordable Health Care, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 11-12
(letter to the editor) (responding to Herzlinger).
154. D. Callahan, Allocating Health Resources, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr./May 1988, at 14, 15
(citing Louis Harris and Associates survey for the Loran Commission).
155. Robert Blendon, The Public's View of the Future of Medical Care, 259 JAMA 3587 (1988).
156. Enthoven & Kronick, Consumer-Choice, supra note 8, at 29, 94.
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2. Tinkering with the Regulation of Underwriting
Another category of proposals focuses on changing the regulation of
underwriting practices. Senator Bentsen's bill, S. 1872,157 includes new federal
regulations for underwriting small groups, federal grants to fifteen states for
small employer purchasing programs, tax changes, and adjustments in the
Medicare statute to provide benefits for colorectal screenings, immunizations,
well-child care, and mammography. Bentsen would also pre-empt state regula-
tions of managed care with federal certification requirements and utilization
review programs. Tax deductions for the self-employed would be increased
to 100% from the current 25%. Representative Rostenkowski's proposal
("Rostenkowski I") parallels the Bentsen plan, with minor variations. "' H.R.
1230, H.R. 3084, and S. 314 propose federal preemption of mandated state
benefit laws, while H.R. 2121, and S. 1177 call for reinsurance pooling
mechanisms."' These proposals do not directly address universal access or
cost control. Adjustments in underwriting practices may expand access to
some, but will not provide the capacity to control the costs of that access over
time. Problems of free ridership and cost-shifting will continue. Underwriting
adjustments are, in one sense, better than no reform at all, yet to press for
them now risks spending substantial political capital on reforms that will not
deliver fundamental relief to the American public.
3. Malpractice Liability Reform
Finally, another group of what we have termed tinkering proposals concen-
trates on tort reform.16 The problems of medical malpractice are undeniably
serious. Medical malpractice insurance premiums alone cost $5.5 billion; legal
fees and malpractice awards amount to $4.1 billion more.161 The indirect
costs, popularly termed "defensive medicine," undoubtedly add to that bill. 162
Yet the concerns go beyond legal and medical costs. The threat of malpractice
litigation has become a major concern of American doctors. In contrast to the
experience of American doctors, Canadian physicians "are only one-fifth as
157. S. 1872, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
158. H.R. 3626, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See also H.R. 1565 (Johnson), H.R. 2535, H.R. 3410,
H.R. 3478, S. 700 (Durenberger), and S. 1872 (all bills from 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
159. All bills from 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
160. H.R. 3516 (Kyl), H.R. 1004, H.R. 2701, H.R. 2783, H.R. 3410, S. 489, S. 1123, S. 1232 (all
bills from 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
161. The Future of Health Care in America: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Education and
Health of the Joint Economic Committee, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-11 (1988) (statement of Joseph A.
Califano, Jr., former Secretary of HHS); Martin Tolchin, Concern Overthe Costs of Malpractice Liability,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1989, at D4.
162. See Roger Reynolds et al., The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 JAMA 2776 (1987);
Susan Dentzer & Dorian Friedman, America's Scandalous Health Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar.
12, 1990, at 24.
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likely to be sued."163 The current system is also capricious. For example,
experts have found, on the one hand, that there was no medical negligence in
80% of cases in which patients sued, and, on the other hand, that 97% of
patients who did suffer from medical negligence never brought suit. 1 4 To
complicate matters further, however, malpractice litigation is positively
correlated with a reduction in the incidence of malpractice. 65
Tort reform thus has a place in any fundamental plan for health insurance
reform. By itself, however, liability reform will neither constrain costs nor
improve access.166 Moreover, tort reform that limits recovery might also
increase the incidence of negligent medical care. We therefore term such
liability reform efforts as tinkering. Focusing on tort reform as a panacea to
America's medical ills poses two risks: (1) that we will lose sight of the need
for larger-scale reforms; and (2) that we will lose the opportunity to use
malpractice reform as political leverage in an overall strategy for medical
insurance financing reform. It might, for example, induce otherwise hesitant
medical groups to support wide-ranging financial and administrative change.
D. Fundamental Reform through National Health Plans with All-Payer Rules
The widely noted "play or pay" proposals take their particular shape in an
effort to build on current employer-based insurance plans. We have grouped
the play or pay plans under the heading of fundamental reform through all-
payer rules because such plans have the potential, if properly structured at the
outset, to control costs through government regulation of fee schedules and
reimbursement rates. We pay particular attention in this section to how well
these plans address the key role of all-payer rules.
In general, these play or pay proposals attempt to provide universal cover-
age by requiring employers either to provide health insurance to their employ-
ees ("play") or to pay a tax ("pay") into a public fund that would cover the
uninsured. They all attempt to deal with problems of job "lock-in" by requiring
forms of community-rating and limits on pre-existing condition clauses. They
provide relatively comprehensive benefits, but with limitations that may
exclude some necessary care or undermine patients' sense of security. All of
these plans require significant out-of-pocket payments (cost-sharing) by pa-
163. Peter C. Coyte et al., Medical Malpractice-The Canadian Experience, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED.
89, 92 (1991).
164. Troyen Brennan, Incidence ofAdverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 371, 373 (1991); A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and
Adverse Events Due to Negligence-Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 111, 325 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 245, 247 (1991).
165. Seegenerally PAULWEILER, PATIENTS, DOCTORS& LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990).
166. See Troyen Brennan, Improving the Quality of Medical Care: A Critical Evaluation of the Major
Proposals in this volume.
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tients. Financing comes from a variety of tax sources. In each of these plans,
private insurance would continue to play a central role.
The Mitchell-Kennedy-Riegle-Rockefeller bill, known as "AmeriCare, " 167
embodies the most prominent play or pay proposal. Under its provisions,
employers must purchase coverage for employees or contribute a percentage
of their payrolls to the public plan. Employees not covered by their employers,
those eligible for Medicaid, and other low-income individuals would be eligible
for the public plan, which would replace Medicaid. AmeriCare would be
administered by the states under federal guidelines and financed through
employer and employee payroll contributions and unspecified federal revenues.
As with the other employer-based plans, AmeriCare would allow significant
out-of-pocket patient payments. A Federal Health Expenditure Board would
have the authority to set national spending goals and to negotiate binding fee
schedules, in effect creating the potential for an all-payer system. States would
be empowered to form consortia to negotiate with providers over reimburse-
ment rates. AmeriCare would require that private insurance plans offer a basic
range of benefits, prohibit insurers from excluding pre-existing conditions, and
mandate that premiums be based on community rating. 168 Because of its
expansion of access, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that S. 1227
would add an additional $28 billion to national health expenditures. 169
Representative Dan Rostenkowski also has introduced a play or pay variant
known as the Health Insurance Coverage and Cost Containment Act of 1991
("Rostenkowski II"). 17° As with the other play or pay proposals, the public
part of this proposed insurance plan would be similar to Medicare. States
would act as fiscal intermediaries, but the federal Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) would administer the program. A Cost Containment
Commission would set national health expenditure targets, negotiate physician
payment rates, and prepare global capital budgets for hospitals. As with
AmeriCare, Rostenkowski's bill thus has the potential to set in place all-payer
rules to constrain costs. Employers would directly finance 80% of the cost of
premiums or pay a 9% payroll tax for all full-time workers in their employ.
The benefits package would be similar to Medicare. For physicians, the public
plan would set reimbursement ceilings (using Medicare's resource-based,
relative value scales (RBRVS)), but, unlike a fully all-payer system, would also
permit extra billing. Enrollees in the public plan would pay a premium, but
the government would subsidize premiums for the poor. Medicaid would be
167. S. 1227, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
168. Community rating refers to setting premiums on the basis of geographic location rather than on
the basis of an individual's past experience of sickness or medical-care use.
169. JODY HOFFMAN ET AL., SIMULTANEOUS SOLUTIONS: SINGLE PAYER NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE IS THE BEST CURE FOR THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL CRISIS 11 (1991) (citing
Milt Freudenheim, Economic Scene: Seeking Fairer Health Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1991, at D2).
170. H.R. 3205, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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continued, but with higher reimbursement rates. Rostenkowski's proposal
would raise revenue through the 9 % payroll tax, a surtax on income of individ-
uals and corporations (rising from 6% in 1993 to 9% in 1996), higher hospital
taxes, and individual contributions of 20% of the premium. Like AmeriCare,
the Rostenkowski variant would require a standard set of minimum benefits
in private insurance, mandate community rating for their insurance premiums,
and limit the use of preexisting conditions in enrollment practices. The cost-
sharing provisions would be nearly identical to those of AmeriCare. 7'
The Waxman and Rockefeller plans 72 would follow the play or pay
route, preserving Medicare, encouraging employer-based plans, and creating
a new public plan which would incorporate Medicaid benefits. For those
covered by the public plan, physicians would be reimbursed using adjusted
Medicare payment rates. Such rates would be optional for the qualified em-
ployer plans. Because these rates would be optional only for employer plans,
rather than required for all payers, however, the Waxman-Rockefeller proposal
offers the least potential for effective cost-control of all the play or pay propos-
als. 173 Under the plan, employers would pay a 7% payroll tax or 80% of
premium costs. Corporations and individuals would pay an income surtax. As
with the other play or pay plans, employees would pay 20 % of premiums, and
face deductibles and out-of-pocket expenses with a cap of $3,000. The federal
government, as is generally the case for play or pay plans, would provide
subsidies for low-income people to enroll in the public plan.
Brookings Institution economist Henry Aaron provides yet another variation
of the play or pay plans. His proposal includes "quasi-independent state
regulatory agencies" authorized to set fee schedules for physicians, to establish
hospital budgets, to finance "regional centers for the provision of particular
services," and to serve as the "conduit for federal payments."' 74 The federal
government would limit total spending, while the state agencies, on the basis
of medical efficacy and cost/utility studies not yet widely available, would
171. Under the broadly similar proposal of the National Leadership Coalition on Health Care (NLC),
all employers would either have to offer health insurance with a defined minimum of benefits to employees
or pay a tax. In either event, companies would be required to pay a tax for uncovered part-time workers.
The plan places a $1,000 cap on cost-sharing. The NLC plan does provide for cost controls, but "[c]on-
siderable doubts exist over whether the controls proposed by the NLC would effectively hold down costs
unless these controls were buttressed by direct limits on the budgets of hospitals and restrictions on the
range of services that can be provided outside the hospital setting (and hence outside the budget limits)."
AARON, supra note 146, at 125.
172. H.R. 2535, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (Waxman); S. 1177, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(Rockefeller).
173. See also H.R. 3535, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Roybal) (negotiated fee schedules for public
plan are optional for qualified employer plans). The Roybal plan has two interesting features not found
in other play or pay proposals. First, Roybal's bill would establish an independent federal agency to
administer the program. Second, it would incorporate a German-style system for prescription drug payments
with use guidelines and pharmaceutical equivalents.
174. AARON, supra note 146, at 142-43.
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decide which medical services to fund. 175 Aaron calls for a gradual transition
to community-based rating and government payments for medical expenses that
exceed a fixed limit on the financial liability of insurers (stop-loss protection).
Depending on the precise liability protected, this "stop-loss limit would be the
focus of debate on whether the United States is to retain a mixture of employ-
er-sponsored and public insurance or will shift gradually to all-public financ-
ing, with the gradual elimination of private companies from the health insur-
ance business."176 In other words, as the stop-loss limit was lowered, the
government plan would assume more of the insurance risk.
The play or pay proponents urge adoption of their plans now, "while
leaving for later debate the divisive question of what role private insurance
should ultimately play."177 We disagree for several reasons. First, we do not
believe that the survival of an industry that most Americans dislike should be
allowed to block fundamental reform. Second, why set up a program one
anticipates will not work in the hope that it will fall apart in the direction of
good policy? If one worries that the United States cannot achieve a fundamen-
tal reform now, would it not be better to achieve a step in the direction one
considers substantively desirable and politically feasible?17 Third, all the
play or pay schemes suffer from the same problem: they leave in place a
complex, costly administrative apparatus, one that already annually drains
billions of insurance dollars away from the provision of medical care.'79
Moreover, were such plans enacted without strict all-payer rules, America
might well be left with "an open-ended ... system, [involving] a multiplicity
of payers and managed fee-for-service [that] is inherently inflationary. "180
Most play or pay reform proposals seek to minimize the appearance of
taxation and fail to embrace the clear statement that we need fundamental
reform-not shoring up a failing private insurance industry. A reasonable
forecast is that most of these proposals, if enacted in their original form, would
prove unsatisfactory over time. Offering employers a choice of whether to use
private or public plans creates perverse incentives. It makes it very likely that
the residual governmental program will attract the worst risks and incur the
175. Id. at 143, 150. By medical efficacy, we mean the impact on health status of medical interven-
tions; by cost-utility studies we mean investigations of the financial cost per unit of improvement in health
status, sense of well-being, etc.
176. Id. at 143-44.
177. Id. at 152.
178. See Lake, supra note 5, in this volume. See also infra part IV.
179. Kevin Grumbach et al., Liberal Benefits, Conservative Spending: The Physicians for a National
Health Program Proposal, 265 JAMA 2549, 2549-54 (1991); Himmelstein & Woolhandler, supra note
26, at 441-45; Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 26, at 1253-58.
180. Morrison, supra note 129, at 16. See also Stuart Butler, 'Play or Pay'Health-Care Plan Is Bound
to Be a Loser, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 3, 1992, at A6 [hereinafter Butler, Play or Pay]. Butler argues that the
benefits package and laws preventing discrimination on the basis of health characteristics will eventually
turn play or pay into pay, pay, pay, and then into a Canadian or British system once we revolt from the
excesses of these plans.
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highest per capita costs. How could the government plan not be perceived as
a failure under those circumstances? Additionally, implementing such a pro-
gram would likely lead not to stability, but to a sharp division between the
more expensive government program and the less expensive private ones. (This
prediction would hold unless the government discourages enrollment in the
public plan by setting its premium very high in relation to average health insur-
ance costs. Under that condition, the cost pressures would shift back towards
private insurers-hardly the proven recipe for cost containment.) Thus, despite
all the talk about "mandatory cost controls," continuing to use our present
insurance apparatus would perpetuate the intrusive, complicated, and costly
administration that so bedevils us, while promising little restraint on rampant
medical inflation.
Some advocates support play or pay because it appears more "doable" than
the more desirable options. 8' For example, Ron Pollack and Phyllis Torda
concede that "a pay-or-play system with cost controls is inherently more
complex than a Canadian-style system and produces less administrative econo-
my," but they claim that play or pay "has the political advantage of requiring
far less money to be raised in new taxes, thereby making it easier to en-
act. " 12 We argue that the perceived political constraints and the political
feasibility of play or pay are substantially overstated and misunderstood.
Employers will not, in general, favor plans that impose more costs on them
than they are currently paying in health benefits. Play or pay cannot fail to do
so, especially for firms whose employees lack health insurance or have very
restricted coverage. More crucially, a plan without effective cost control will
not reduce the overall financial burden of medical costs that weigh on the
competitiveness of American firms. In addition to problems facing employers
under such programs, insurers will not favor a plan that cuts into the private
insurance market, as any successful play or pay plan must.
A play or pay program would also retain the high administrative costs of
the current system. It would perpetuate the -fragmented pools of insured, unin-
sured, and insured-at-high cost persons, and would diffuse accountability
across many actors. Such plans might also burden small businesses and pro-
duce discrimination against employees on the basis of health characteristics-
not to mention expensive litigation in response." 3 "The key question is not
who operates the insurance system," as Paul Starr has noted, "but under what
181. See Ronald Pollack & Phyllis Torda, The Pragmatic Road Toward National Health Insurance,
AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1991, at 92; AARON, supra note 146, at 150.
182. Pollack & Torda, supra note 181, at 96. Of course, the political feasibility of a given plan is
difficult to determine. The stalemate between Nixon and Kennedy over health-care reform in 1974 would
indicate that politicians should settle early for less and worry about getting more later; the lesson of the
1965 compromise over Medicare, where early compromise needlessly undermined the ability of reformers
to achieve more fundamental ends, would 'indicate the opposite.
183. Butler, Play or Pay, supra note 180, at A6.
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rules it operates." 84 In large part, the play or pay proponents appear to have
learned the first lesson well but have not paid enough attention to the second.
Myths about American medical politics, combined with well-financed lobbying
by anxious interest groups, have convinced some legislative reformers that
what is really desirable is not politically feasible. However, if the play or pay
plans that are politically feasible are also unlikely to be desirable, should we
not be searching for better combinations of political feasibility and policy
design? We believe that there are effective and acceptable alternatives avail-
able, if our congressional leaders and the President move beyond conventional
wisdom about political possibilities.
Movement toward that goal has been striking in the period since May 1991,
when the AmeriCare bill was first introduced with considerable fanfare. As
the sponsors sought support, they found disappointingly few converts. Many
critics insisted that the bill's cost controls required strengthening and that the
incorporation of bargains in the initial formulation had produced too weak a
reform package. As a result, a number of play or pay models, including
AmeriCare, now do incorporate a serious all-payer regulatory structure and
consequently have some promise of constraining costs. The combination of
universal coverage and such regulatory provisions leads play or pay plans
towards fundamental reform along the German model of politically negotiated,
financially responsible fee schedules and budgets.. Nonetheless, even these
plans retain very substantial administrative costs and promise less restraint on
costs than other fundamental reform plans discussed below. Furthermore, the
adjustments in these bills have been made in successive stages; the obvious
danger is that the coherence of such bills may have fallen victim to partially
incompatible and administratively costly "improvements."
E. Fundamental Reforms through Universal Health Plans with Concentrated
Buying Power
While it is possible to design workable forms of national health insurance
using multiple insurers, international experience suggests that reforms that
concentrate financial responsibility and political accountability are more likely
to constrain costs over the long run while making health insurance universally
available to Americans. Under single-payer arrangements, all Americans would
be eligible for the government's insurance plan, but would remain free to
choose their medical providers. Such a program, according to estimates of the
General Accounting Office, could save over $67 billion in its first year-
enough to finance universal coverage without co-payments or deductibles."
184. Starr, Middle Class, supra note 61, at 11.
185. CANADLAN HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 7.
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Why does a single-payer arrangement tend to constrain costs? Pressures
to spend more on medical care exist everywhere among the industrial democra-
cies. In fragmented finance systems, each payer is interested in her medical
costs, not the overall costs of medical care. Any cost shifted represents a 100%
gain to that payer; hence the competition under pluralistic financing to have
someone else pay whenever possible. In the United States, this incentive
manifests itself in attention to cost-sharing by patients (shifting costs back-
ward), the government requirement that private insurance pay Medicare
benefits for certain retired workers (shifting costs sideways), and the reverse,
as when companies reduce or eliminate their health insurance benefits and turn
employees into potential charity cases for local hospitals and doctors. Under
such systems, total costs are discovered, not decided, at the end of the year.
The results are expensive, as the American experience demonstrates.
Two countervailing forces appear to be at work in single-payer systems that
address medical inflation and unwanted cost-shifting. First, other bureaucratic
institutions compete for the tax funds that medical-care claims. These competi-
tors, whether departments of education, transportation, or finance, have
obvious organizational incentives to voice what economists term the 'opportuni-
ty costs' of medicine. Second, concentrating political accountability for insur-
ance powerfully constrains any cost-shifting back to patients. Over the past two
decades, Canadian governments have been able to withstand persistent efforts
to introduce patient cost-sharing or, with some lapses, to permit extra-bill-
ing. 86 The Canadian health professions face what amounts to a consumer's
cooperative in bargaining over what a provincial health budget will be in any
particular year. Some provincial politicians have been interested from time to
time in off-loading this pressure onto patient charges. The Canada Health Act
of 1984 reasserted the public's ethical presumption against such practices and
backed it up with financial penalties on provinces that allow extra-billing.
Without the law's force, it is safe to say that Canadian physician expenditures
would no doubt have grown more rapidly through increased patient pay-
ments. 7
This argument for concentrated payer power presumes that bargaining
imbalances in the current medical market allow providers to drive up costs.
Because every marginal dollar of expenditure for medical services translates
186. Extra-billing (or "balance billing" as it is known in Canada) is the process by which medical-care
providers charge patients more than the negotiated fee for a given service. It is a particular form of patient
cost-sharing.
187. CANADIAN HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 35-36. After passage of the 1984 Act, the
Canadian financial sanctions for extra-billing by physicians became quite simple: every dollar a province
allows in extra-billing reduces the federal block grant by a dollar. If any of the provinces believed the
physician contentions that patient cost-sharing through extra-billing would reduce needless and wasteful
medical care at a rate where there was more than a dollar's reduction in care given for every dollar of
penalty, that province presumably would have permitted cost-sharing to continue. None have. See Evans,
Canadian Health-Care, supra note 80, in this volume.
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into income for identifiable and organized health-care providers, the payer side
must have a correspondingly concentrated interest in those marginal dollars
to balance those stake-holders who regard each unit of expenditure as benefit,
not cost. Balancing these interests does not mean health expenditures will
assume any particular level and stay there, but it does appear to provide a
necessary condition for establishing publicly selected limits on expenditure
levels." 8
To the degree single-payer cost control works, it necessarily disappoints
the income aspirations of at least some health professionals. Physicians' fees,
for example, are approximately 234% higher in the United States than in
Canada,"8 9 and the take-home pay of American physicians averages more
than 50% higher than that of Canadian doctors. 90 The chief executives of
American hospitals earned an average base salary of over $103,000 in 1990,
while those receiving incentive pay averaged $125,000. The salaries of Ameri-
can hospital executives grew 8.5% in 1989, while the CPI increased by only
4.6%.91 Even with the purchasing power of Canada's national health insur-
ance, its doctors remain well-paid. They were the highest-paid professionals
in Canada prior to the introduction of universal medical insurance and they
remain so.1
92
Cost control may, of course, threaten the quality of care as well as medical
incomes-a vastly different result. But medical-care professionals can justifi-
ably mobilize public support to make sure that cost restraints do not seriously
lower the quality of care. These fights-which always mix considerations of
income with those of quality of care-make the regular determination of
hospital budgets, and especially doctors' fees, very contentious matters. It is
of the utmost importance to anticipate such contentiousness and, within the
limits set by budgetary goals themselves, to design formats, select negotiators,
and employ modes of public explanation that do not worsen the pain which
such struggles entail.
Several prominent bills in Congress adopt a single-payer approach to. the
188. A single-payer system with providers who organize to negotiate is technically not a monopsony,
but rather a bilateral monopoly. Of course, a single-payer system does not guarantee cost control. The buyer
will have to weigh the pressures exerted in favor of cost control against those in favor of greater expendi-
ture. Providers will sometimes be able to mobilize voter support for additional financing of services that
they believe are in short supply. For example, public outcry over a perceived shortage of cardiac surgery
in Ontario lead to an increase in hospital budgets to allow for more surgery. See Detsky et al., supra note
83, at 565.
189. Victor R. Fuchs & James S. Hahn, How Does Canada Do It?, 323 NEw ENO. J. MED. 884,
886 (1990).
190. Evans et al., Canadian Reality, supra note 27, at 571-72.
191. Herzlinger, supra note 30, at 74.
192. Misleading Notions, supra note 50, at 23. See generally ROBERT G. EVANs, STRAINED MERCY
(1984); Morris L. Barer et al., Fee Controls as Cost Control: Tales from the Frozen North, 66 MtLBANK
Q. 1 (1988).
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financial reform of American medicine."" Under Congressman Russo's
Universal Health Care Plan, all American citizens would receive a national
health insurance card that they would present to their provider of choice when
seeking medical care. Benefits would be quite broad, including what most
would consider the full range of modern medicine: inpatient care, nursing
facilities, home health services, hospice, physician and other professional
services, preventive services, (including pre- and post- natal care and well-
child care), limited mental health services, and home-based services, as well
as prescription drugs, long-term care, dental and vision care. The plan would
eliminate all forms of patient cost-sharing, and no "extra" billing would be
permitted for insured services. The Russo bill seeks to contain costs through
national health expenditure budgets.
Hospitals would have to work within global budgets, negotiated annually,
with separate budgets for capital outlays and medical education. The Secretary
of HHS would set national fee schedules, with geographic variations, for
physician payment. The proposal would permit, not require, alternative
payment methods or health maintenance organizations: financing group practic-
es on global budgets, fee schedules, prospective payment systems, or capita-
tion, within federal guidelines.
Administration and financing under the Russo plan would occur on both
federal and state levels, with the federal government setting expenditure targets
for the states. The states or the federal government would contract with one
organization in each state to process financial claims. Private insurance compa-
nies would no longer serve an underwriting function, but might act as fiscal
intermediaries or sell supplemental insurance for services not covered. The
revenues for the Russo program would come from a variety of tax sources:
employer payrolls, corporate and personal incomes, premiums on the elderly
for long term care, and the taxation of social security benefits; states would
be required to contribute $85 per capita plus 85 % of the state's current Medic-
aid contribution. All of these funds would be placed in a National Health Trust
Fund. The Russo bill would simplify health insurance administration greatly,
193. Among the single-payer options, at the forefront are those offered by Representative Marty Russo
(D-IL), H.R. 1300, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Universal Health Care Plan), and Senator Bob Kerrey
(D-NE), S. 1446, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Health USA Act). The Russo and Kerrey single-payer
schemes are being advocated by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
Public Citizen Health Research Group, and Physicians for a National Health Plan. See generally HOFFMAN
ET AL., supra note 169. Both H.R. 1300 and S. 1446 would lead to significant savings for state and local
governments. HOFFMAN ET AL., supra, at 5.
Representative Stark's "Mediplan," H.R. 650, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) would offer Medicare
insurance to all American citizens. Physicians and hospitals would be reimbursed under Medicare payment
rules. To pay for the program, he would raise individual income taxes, and apply a new payroll tax and
a new 4% corporate income tax to a federal health-care trust fund. Except for pregnant women, children,
and the poor, Stark's plan would allow patient cost-sharing with a cap on out-of-pocket expenses. Although
termed "Medicare for All," Stark's bill would set up essentially the same payment structures as Kerrey's
Health USA Act or Mitchell's AmeriCare.
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by eliminating all other federal programs, setting fee schedules and common
benefit packages, and restricting private insurance to the role of fiscal
agents. 1
94
Senator Bob Kerrey's Health USA Act of 1991 is almost as far-reaching
as the Russo bill. 9 ' It would provide universal coverage independent of
employment status in private plans or in state plans. The proposal would
prohibit private insurers from excluding those with "pre-existing conditions,"
and would mandate a basic benefits package. Consumers would have a choice
among competing insurance plans. Instead of paying premiums to their private
insurers, Americans would pay taxes into a health care trust fund, a symbol
of the link between the taxes and their programmatic use. The states then
would pay each private plan a standard amount for each enrollee. States would
also be required to sponsor a public insurance program as a payer of last
resort. The Kerrey proposal would requir6 patient cost-sharing, but would limit
out-of-pocket expenses. It would permit no cost-sharing for preventive services
or inpatient care. The state plan or private plans would pay providers on the
basis of national fee schedules modeled on Medicare's Resource-Based Relative
Value Scale (RBRVS) system. These rates would constitute ceilings for private
insurance plan reimbursement schedules. Hospitals would be financed by the
state program, based on individual hospital negotiations. Private plans would
be charged for their patients use of hospital services. Separate capital budgets
would be established. Finally, an independent federal commission would
oversee the program's operation.
Kerrey estimates that his national health insurance program would have
saved $11 billion in 1991 alone, and $150 billion over the period 1991-95. t2'
Revenue would be drawn from existing federal and state sources; payroll,
corporate and unearned income taxes; a new top individual income tax rate;
and an increase in both the wage base for social security contributions and the
amount of Social Security benefits subject to taxation. Health-care budgets
would be set annually by the federal commission, based on demographic
changes and other factors.
Kerrey's plan combines federal financing and state regulation with competi-
tive bidding among insurers. The question of what role, if any, private health
insurance firms should play is relevant to all the plans we have discussed, but
194. A bill introduced by Senator Paul Welistone (D-MN) is essentially the Senate version of the Russo
bill, with only minor variations. S. 2320, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). A more recent variant is S. 2513,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (Daschle), which has two key innovations: (1) Federal administration would
center on a Health Board, an independent agency modeled on the Federal Reserve; (2) States would have
the authority to negotiate provider reimbursement rates and hospital global budgets.
195. S. 1446,102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See also E. Richard Brown, Health USA: A National
Health Program for the United States, 267 JAMA 552 (1992).
196. SEN. BOB KERREY, THE HEALTH ACT OF 1991: A PROPOSAL TO MAKE HEALTH CARE
AFFORDABLE AND AVAILABLE TO ALL AMERICANS 5 (July 11, 199 1); see Daniel N. Mendelson & Judith
Arnold, Evaluating the Cost of Health-Care Reform Plans in this volume.
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it is particularly salient for universal, single-payer proposals. Allowing multiple
insurers to compete as underwriters, rather than restricting them to "post
office" roles, would dissipate some of the monopsony gains of a single-payer
system. The key distinction between the Kerrey and the Russo plans is that
Kerrey allows such an underwriting and competitive role for private insurers
while Russo, drawing on the Canadian experience, rejects any such major role
for private insurers. A number of Canadian provinces introduced universal
physician insurance in the 1960s and retained traditional health insurance
organizations as financial intermediaries and political buffers for a limited
period;197 such insurers, however, did not play an underwriting, competitive
function, and soon become useless appendages. It is theoretically possible to
have effective all-payer regulations and competitive insurers without having
any differentiation on the basis of risk, but without such differentiation, private
insurers will have lost a major basis for their ability to compete. With such
differentiation, cost and access difficulties would arise again and significant
opportunities for administrative simplification and cost reductions would be
lost.
F. Reforming Medical-Care Financing and Administration through State Models
Whatever happens on the federal level in the next few years, states almost
surely will continue to innovate in medical-care financing.98 State exper-
imentation in medical-care reform may prove useful in spurring reform on the
national level, and several bills have been introduced in Congress to encourage
such experimentation. 99 (In Canada, the province of Saskatchewan led the
way towards a national health insurance program.) State plans have the advan-
tage of local adaptation and, perhaps, greater local voter participation in the
formation of any medical-care insurance plan. State implementation efforts also
raise important questions regarding the appropriate locus of financial and
political accountability that will, in turn, have to be addressed by any national
health insurance plan.
Cross-national evidence suggests that it is the concentration of financial
responsibility, not its precise location, that chiefly restrains inflationary health
197. See, e.g., the role of private insurers under H.R. 3689, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Johnston)
(states may contract with private insurers to administer plans).
198. See generally Symposium: Relying on the States, HEALTH MGMT. Q., First Quarter 1991; John
E. McDonough, States First: The Other Path to National Health Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1992,
at 61; Milt Freudenheim, Health Insurance, Some States Are Going Back to Basics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
26, 1992, § 4 (Week in Review), at ES.
199. See, e.g., S. 1227 (Wellstone amendment to the Health America bill) (encourages states to
develop single-payer plans); H.R. 2530 (Sanders) (encourages individual states to adopt single-payer
systems); H.R. 8 (Oakar) (essentially the same as Sanders); H.R. 2114 (Sabo) (state plans for the poor);
H.R. 1230 (Grandy) (state plans for those with uninsurable risks); H.R. 16 (Dingell) (new state insurance
plans) (all bills from 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
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pressures. 2" It so happens that Canada, by constitutional requirement, must
use its ten provincial governments and two territories as the administratively
responsible agents of its national health insurance program. The lesson for the
United States: other administrative options exist, as long as financial power
remains concentrated and public agents are accountable. An American single-
payer system could focus that accountability in the states and the federal
government, in regional entities, or in local entities; non-governmental or
quasi-independent agencies could play a role as well. The more buyers, levels
of government, and other agencies involved, however, the more diffuse that
countervailing power is likely to be.
Hawaii has had a mandatory employer-based health insurance program
since 1974 that covers 95 % of its population. In 1989, Hawaii added a public
program with a minimum benefits package to attempt to cover the remaining
5 %. Hawaii has achieved very high coverage rate at per capita costs approxi-
mating the national average. 20 ' Numerous other states have started programs
or proposed them: Massachusetts (a play or pay scheme that still awaits
funding); Washington (subsidies for health insurance); Minnesota (state-subsi-
dized insurance for uninsured not eligible for Medicaid who earn up to $37,000
for a family of three, based on a sliding-scale premium, and free preventative
care for children);2"2 Colorado, New Jersey, New York (some increased
funding for children's benefits); Rhode Island and Kentucky (minimum benefits
requirement, with a waiver for small companies without health insurance);
Connecticut (non-exclusion of certain individuals from private plans; reinsur-
ance to back-up);2"3 and Oregon (rationing of services under Medicaid).
Other plans have been introduced in California, 2' Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Vermont, and Washington.2 5
Maryland has administered a relatively cost-effective system of hospital all-
payer rate regulation since 1974, lowering its hospital costs as a result.
206
As but one example of the current reform movement in the states, the New
York State Department of Health has proposed a plan known as Universal New
York Health Care (UNY*Care).O7 New York's UNY*Care plan is still in
200. See Evans, Canadian Health-Care, supra note 80, in this volume.
201. AARON, supra note 146, at 123-24.
202. Edward Walsh, Filling Health Care Gaps: Minnesota Plan Expands Access to Insurance, WASH.
POST, Apr. 17, 1992, at Al.
203. Connecticut's Comptroller has also issued a plan for a large-scale PPO for government workers.
WILLIAM E. CURRY, JR., HEALTH-CARE COST RELIEF FOR DISTRESSED MUNICIPALITIES: A LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL (1991).
204. See California's Medical Model, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1992, at A16 (advocating "managed
competition" approach).
205. HOFFMAN ET AL., supra note 169, at 14 & n.24 (listing states where single-payer legislation has
been introduced).
206. See Michael R. Merson, Managing in Maryland, HEALTH MGMT Q., First Quarter 1991, at 24.
207. See Dan E. Beauchamp & Ronald L. Rouse, Universal New York Health Care: A Single-Payer
Strategy Linking Cost Control and Universal Access, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 640, 640-43 (1990).
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its political infancy, but the plan as of the spring of 1990 combined incongru-
ous elements of play or pay, single-payer, all-payer, and private insurance.
The plan includes a so-called single-payer that would function not as a monop-
sonistic purchaser, but rather as a rate-setter for all providers; it would also
act as a single conduit for payments among providers, private insurers, and
consumers. UNY*Care would limit private insurance liability for an individual
to $25,000 for inpatient care and $25,000 for outpatient care annually (the
"stop-loss" limit). The state plan then would cover costs over $25,000 and the
bills of the uninsured. The limit on insurance outlays for particular cases aims
to reduce variations in experience-based premiums across plans. If not adjusted
for inflation, this cap would gradually shift more insurance from private
insurers to the public plan. Disqualification for coverage because of preexisting
conditions would be prohibited for employer-based plans.20 8
The prospects for these plans are rather modest, however, without consid-
erable federal cooperation and financial assistance. States face numerous
obstacles in implementing any health plan, including problems of raising
sufficient revenues, developing administrative mechanisms, and wrangling with
the federal government over waivers from the requirements of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Medicare, and Medicaid." More-
over, poorer states will face even more burdensome forms of each of these
obstacles. For these reasons, federal legislation, such as the Wellstone amend-
ment to the Mitchell bill, are of critical importance in moving states towards
cost-effective, universal health insurance plans.210
IV. TOWARDS NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: STEPS FORWARD
The central claim of our article is this: A straightforward version of
national health insurance is ethically and financially desirable, politically
feasible, and administratively implementable. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that the American political system will produce such an outcome in
the near future. In this section, we describe several steps forward the federal
government might take. These measures-as opposed to the patchwork tinker-
ing described earlier-could become the building blocks of a national health
insurance plan. The crucial factor in implementing any such step forward is
to ensure that it begins with the proper structure, and that key financing and
administrative choices are made clearly at the beginning of the process. In
particular, cost-control mechanisms through fee schedules and hospital reim-
208. Id.
209. See Deborah Stone, ,Why the States Can't Solve the Health Care Crisis, AM. PROSPECT, Spring
1992, at 51.
210. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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bursement rates or global budgets need to be put in place at the outset. Access
then may be increased sequentially by population group or type of service. We
propose four steps forward below; the first three steps forward rely on fimanc-
ing through sliding-scale premiums paid to federal or state governments, while
the fourth proposal would not necessarily alter current private premium
payment schemes.
A. Universal Maternal and Well-Child Insurance Plus Stopgap Measures in
Medicare Reform and Tax Credits for Catastrophic Coverage
Lack of access to affordable prenatal and childhood care remains one of
America's largest failures. Such care, however, is highly cost-effective. One
can begin to build a political and social community that supports universal
health insurance by focusing on a group that most Americans readily regard
as needing and deserving health care. Because doctors tend to be the most
concerned about access for this group, a program designed for them might
lessen provider opposition. Furthermore, beginning a national health insurance
plan by providing universal insurance coverage for prenatal and well-child care
would set Americans down the road towards thinking about health insurance
in the same way that we currently think about social security insurance-that
is, as a universal program, not as a means-tested, targeted program for the
poor. To lessen opposition to tax increases, premiums based on income would
be paid into a national or state trust fund.
In addition, to expand coverage for the elderly-a group already largely
covered for many essential procedures-Medicare reform could be used to
bridge gaps and simplify administrative procedures. Finally, catastrophic
protection with a high deductible (e.g., 15 % of income) could then be provided
for all Americans through refundable tax credits, but only as a stopgap towards
fundamental reform. These steps forward admittedly would not achieve com-
prehensive cost control or complete access reform. Yet they would increase
access and financial security, begin moving the United States toward universal
coverage, and refrain from adding more complicated layers of tinkering to the
already-muddied American medical-care scene.
B. Universal Hospital Insurance
Providing universal hospital insurance for all Americans would constitute
a more fundamental first step forward, one acknowledging that universal access
is essential for each form of care. Hospital care constitutes the most expensive
and largest component of health expenditures (about 40%), but one-third of
our hospital beds are empty; there clearly is excess supply. Nearly all Ameri-
can hospitals already receive reimbursement for some of their patients under
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Medicare's prospective payment system. The existing Diagnostic Related
Group (DRG) reimbursement system rewards efficient and quality provision
of care, and can be expanded to assume a wider role."' To make effective
cost control more likely, a governmental body could set global state budgets
for hospital care. Such budget-setting would add a major element of monopso-
ny power without necessarily adding much to present overall expenditures
(since most hospital care is "paid for" in some way or another already).
Financing universal hospital insurance would address the problem of uncom-
pensated care and medical bankruptcy, particularly relieving the stresses now
being placed on large urban hospitals. Again, income-based premiums could
be placed in a national medical-care trust fund. Finally, such a step forward
could draw on the wealth of experience in Canada, which, as Robert Evans
describes in another article in this issue, began its national health program with
universal hospital insurance. 2
C. Universal Physician Coverage
An alternative starting point would provide universal physician coverage.
Such a step forward would likely require a less substantial form of govern-
mental expenditure, since physician services currently comprise less than 20%
of total health expenditures. The United States already has experience in
designing fee schedules for physician services in the Medicare program that
could be expanded to cover all population groups. Recent changes in the
Medicare fee schedules increase payments for general practitioners and family
doctors, while reducing those for specialists. 23 Fee schedules for all payers
are potential vehicles for constraining physician expenditures. Moreover,
doctors currently feel many cross pressures: they are dismayed by the large
number of uninsured patients, irritated by complicated and intrusive forms of
utilization review, and burdened with massive paperwork, but they have an
obvious hostility to price setting and budget limits. A national insurance plan
for physician services, quite obviously, also could be financed with premiums
paid to a trust fund.
211. Under a DRG system, hospitals are reimbursed on the basis of a pre-determined rate for a given
illness. Morone and Dunham have called for "an extension of DRGs to cover all payers, factoring into
the rates the cost of uncompensated care." James A. Morone & Andrew B. Dunham, Slouching Towards
National Health Insurance: The New Health Care Politics, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 263, 280 (1985). The
advantages they predict include: competition among hospitals, hidden taxes in the form of public and private
premiums and payments, help for urban hospitals under pressure, and quasi-monopsony power that could
help reduce medical inflation. Id. These advantages, however, are more incremental and technical than
broadly programmatic.
212. Evans, Canadian Health-Care, supra note 80, in this volume.
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D. All-Payer Rules
The alleged American fear of new taxes-even ones earmarked for health
care-may cause some Americans to ask: is it possible to have the right level
of countervailing power without fusing taxing and negotiating responsibility
as the Canadians now do? Put another way, what would be lost if state regula-
tory authorities set the terms of medical-care financing, negotiated fee sched-
ules with physicians and budgets with hospitals, and required that employers
finance health insurance directly or pay a fixed amount per employee into a
state fund?
In some European countries, Germany in particular, national and state
governments have played a powerful role in guiding negotiations among
physicians, hospitals, and sickness funds without fully channeling health
insurance financing through conventional public tax accounts. It is possible to
do so, as long as one recognizes that the sickness funds in Germany are non-
profit; that they cannot compete in any meaningful way with each other for
consumers; and that the government sets strict rules that make the sickness
funds essentially agents of the government.
Play or pay plans with strict all-payer rules do have the potential to move
towards a system of cost control like that of Germany. Again, if play or pay
focuses first on setting up mandated all-payer rules, then the precise financing
and administrative choices to be made later in the game at least can rest on
solid foundations. All-payer rules can be developed that are regionally based,
and that build upon the current prospective payment system and/or the RBRVS.
Optimally, no extra billing above the fee schedule would be allowed; however,
it may be necessary initially to allow such extra billing during a transition
period. In any event, if this compromise route were chosen, a large portion
of the savings from eliminating administrative duplication would be squan-
dered.
As noted, some Canadian provinces used pre-existing health insurance
firms as "post office" intermediaries (for the flow of funds and the processing
of claims) between the provincial authorities and physicians. In the mid-1960s,
that seemed a politically important concession to the sensibilities of some
Canadian physicians, particularly in Ontario. One can imagine the United
States using such intermediaries in the initial stages of national health insur-
ance, as it has done with Medicare since 1965 (through an arrangement that
draws upon private expertise and cuts down on public employees). Within a
few years, however, the Canadians found such indirect management cumber-
some and much more expensive to manage than direct administration. More-
over, while contracting out financial tasks is certainly compatible with political
accountability-as the Canadian experience demonstrates-this approach is
incompatible with continued competition among insurance companies as
medical underwriters. Playing that game means a continuation of the uneven
insurance coverage and adverse risk selection of the 1980s. Instead, if play or
pay plans focus on getting all-payer rules in place at the outset, they may
provide a promising path for fundamental reform over the long-term.
V. CONCLUSION
Any review of the policy choices in medical-care reform must distinguish
proposals to tinker with present arrangements from those that would lead to
fundamental reform. Tinkering proposals focus on how to enable more people
to have insurance, either those not now covered or on those who might lose
coverage easily (job-changers with a serious illness). None of these proposals
acknowledges that American medical care requires fundamental change in
financing and administration. None provides a serious means for cost control
or universal coverage.
Among the fundamental reform plans, three serious options exist. Each
commits to universal coverage and to reasonably comprehensive medical-care
provision. The key differences lie in their approaches to cost containment as
a counterweight to the necessarily increased inflationary pressure brought by
widened coverage. The "modified competitivists," such as Alain Enthoven and
Stuart Butler, recognize subsidization of universal coverage as a precondition
for ethically defensible reform. Both are drawn to the presumptions of neo-
classical micro-economics and its commitment to price competition as the best
allocator of goods and services. Both adhere to the rhetoric of "consumer
choice" among health insurance packages. They differ considerably in the
details, however, especially with regard to how many insurance intermediaries
there should be and who should act as consumer agents. Butler advocates high
co-payments and deductibles to prod consumers into cost-conscious medical
choices. Enthoven eschews price competition through out-of-pocket payments
and instead favors price competition among a limited number of insurers. Both
underestimate the extent to which Americans value the choice of their caregiver
over the choice of their insurance firms. While either of these micro-economic
approaches may work in theory, neither has been systematically implemented
anywhere else in the world.
In contrast to this "pro-competitive" approach are the single-payer propos-
als, all modeled largely on Canada's universal health insurance program. While
single-payer refers only to the financial architecture, the effect of this approach
extends beyond financing. It combines financial accessibility, countervailing
buyer power, and political accountability in a way that maximizes patient
choice and medical autonomy within overall constrained budgets and supply
of capital. It is a necessarily contentious process of decisionmaking. Voice,
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to borrow Hirschman's expression, is its mode, where exit is the key element
in the former, so-called competitive model.214
Although contrasted with the pro-competitive model, anyone who thinks
a national health insurance program lacks competition is misinformed. The
competition is for patients: doctors under fee-for-service, capitation, or other
forms of remuneration require them. Hospitals compete for fame and regard,
countervailed by political control over the budgets within which they operate.
The final major reform options-based on the German model-attempt to
adapt all-payer rules and employer-based insurance to the American medical-
care setting. These proposals, in current form, stray far from their ideal all-
payer model, but do hold out the prospect of beginning a process towards
national health insurance. The key to the success of these plans will be to
establish strict all-payer regulations early in any reform agenda, and to control
tightly the rules of medical underwriting. Then, depending on the level at
which health-care taxes and premiums are set, the plans may gradually move
towards more fundamental reform. The danger with such plans is that the
continued explosion in medical-care costs may overwhelm the reform agenda
before serious steps forward can be made.
American medical-care reform ranks indisputably high on the contemporary
political agenda. The extraordinary consensus-across the ideological spec-
trum-on the need for far-reaching change foreshadows policy adjustments in
the 1990s. There is not, however, any certainty about the effectiveness of the
policy changes we anticipate. To find the right combination of effective and
acceptable reform, we need to explore what our historical experience and the
lessons of other countries tell us about programmatic desirability and political
feasibility. In doing so, we ought seriously to consider the widespread use, in
political systems both similar to and different from our own, of politically
accountable single-payer methods of financing modern medical care.
Nevertheless, there are wide variations in the particular ways in which
countervailing financial and political authority is and can be organized. We
have discussed some of these variants and emphasized the important distinction
between operational principles and institutional expression. Moreover, we have
stressed the primary lesson of comparative health finance: the United States
can move towards any chosen model of universal health insurance in stages,
or even one state at a time. The United States has in fact already taken decisive
steps toward universal coverage, expanding the government's role in covering
one population sub-group after another.
215
We must keep these choices clearly in mind in the months and years ahead.
214. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 115, at 4.
215. Examples include veterans after World. War II, the elderly poor in Kerr-Mills, the elderly
(Medicare) and categories of the poor (Medicaid) in the 1960s, the disabled, victims of kidney failure, and
so on.
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The very range of choices, when combined with our fragmented political
structure and its undisciplined debate, is as likely to produce confusion and
stalemate as steps forward toward fundamental reform. This symposium issue,
one hopes, will help in a small way to reduce the former and enhance the
latter.
